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Das heute baue sich auf das gestem auf, so wie sich das gestern
auf das vorgestem aufgebaut hat.
Adolf Loos**
INTRODUCTION

Can feminism survive the postmodern critique of reason? Or
are the emancipatory aspirations of feminists tied to the continuing
viability of modernist forms of discourse? Recent feminist writing1
indicates that this question is central to the future of feminism as an
emancipatory enterprise: in short, feminism is unthinkable without
philosophy. 2 Feminists seem to have two choices: stick with modernism or give up feminism. Are these the only choices available?
Some feminists fear that unless their arguments are clothed in
the discourse of modernism 3-- objectivity, truth, and reason-feminist aspirations to break free of patriarchal shiackles will be frustrated. 4 These feminists believe that only by transcending our
**
ADOLF Loos, Meine Bauschule, in I SXMTLICHE SCHRIFTEN 323 (1962) ("Let today
build itself on yesterday, just as yesterday built itself on that which came before it.").

I See Sabina Lovibond, Feminism and Postmodernism, 178 NEv LEFT REv. 22 (1989);
Nancy Fraser & LindaJ. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter between
Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19-38 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed.,

1990).
2 "Philosophy" refers to the enterprise that seeks, through the power of reason,
right representation, moral knowledge, truth, and other modernist artifacts. For a discussion of the end of philosophy, and what will succeed it, see AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END
OR TRANSFORMATION? (Kenneth Baynes et al. eds., 1987).

3 Modernity's staunchest defender, Jiirgen Habermas, describes the project of modernity in the following terms:
[T]he project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective
science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to
their inner logic. At the same time, this project intended to release the
cognitive potentials of each of these domains from their esoteric forms.
The Enlightenment philosophers wanted to utilize this accumulation of
specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday life-that is to say, for
the rational organization of everyday social life.
Jilrgen Habermas, Modernity-An Incomplete Project, in THE ANTi-AESTHETIc 9 (Hal Foster
ed., 1983). For Habermas's critique of the critics of modernity, see JiRGEN HABERMAS,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987) (leveling a broad attack on recent Continental thought, in particular the work ofJacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and George Bataille). For a discussion of Habermas's selfconception of his place in the German modernist tradition of philosophy, see Dennis M.
Patterson, Hegel and Postmodernity, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1665 (1989).
4 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the
Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 217, 220 (1988) (book review).
Our journey toward authenticity, however, requires more than discover-

ing our inner selves. We also need to work to create a world in which we
can freely experience our authentic selves. Society has strongly influenced
our gender, as well as our larger personhood. We need to struggle
against limiting forces in our lives to move toward authenticity, which, in
terms of our feminist work, means struggling against the forces of patri-
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current perspective-be it linguistic, social, or political-can women
be emancipated. 5 In short, their contention is that women can only
be liberated by getting their voice to a place it is not, 6 or by speaking
7
a language that is not yet their own.
This Article argues that the choice between feminism8 and
postmodernism 9 is a false one. The claim that these purported inarchy. Our glimpses of our authentic selves can provide us with the
strength and direction necessary to struggle against the brokenness and
subordination in our lives. Without a sense of our authentic selves, we
would have no basis for selecting priorities in our feminist struggles.
Id But see Jeanne Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Peirce's Logic of Imagination and
FeministMethodologies, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1991) (arguing for the reconstruction of feminist jurisprudence by rethinking questions of scientific knowledge and hypothesis
formation).
5 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 867
(1990).
A point-perhaps the point-of legal methods is to reach answers that are
legally defensible or in some sense "right." Methods themselves imply a
stance toward rightness. If being right means having discovered some
final, objective truth based in a fixed physical or moral reality, for example, verification is possible and leaves no room for further perspectives or
for doubt. On the other hand, if being right means that one has expressed one's personal tastes or interests which have no greater claim to
validity than those of anyone else, being right is a rhetorical device used
to assert one's own point of view, and verification is both impossible and
pointless.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ.39 (1985); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
7

See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987).

8 In light of the many projects, aspirations, and theories that can be denominated
"feminist," it makes little sense to advance a definition of feminism. Like all notions,
"feminism" has a grammar for its usage; this grammar, however, is contested. Hence, it
seems silly to draw lines when no one is entirely reasonable. Better simply to notice and
appreciate the multiplicity of meanings inherent in the term.
9 It is difficult to describe postmodernism in a sentence or two, for postmodernism
"belongs to a network of 'post' concepts and thinking-post-industrial society, poststructuralism, post-empiricism, post-rationalism.... ." ALBRECHT WELLMER, ZUR
DIALEKTIK VON MODERNE UND POSTMODERNE 48 (1985). In discussing postmodernism, it
is helpful to observe two dichotomies: modern-postmodern and modernity-postmodernity. The modern-postmodern dichotomy identifies philosophical positions. For example, if you believe that musical ideas have a nature that is expressed in the written score,

and that composers work within musical traditions to give expression to musical ideas,
then you are a modernist. If you believe that past musical traditions "exist" for the
purposes of the composer, and that the tradition of understanding and developing musical ideas places no restrictions on what the composer can or ought to do, your attitude is
postmodern. The connections between music, modernity, and postmodernism are
spelled out in Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other PerformingArts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991) (providing a modernist, psycho-social explanation by resorting to the mechanism or causal process of (legal) cultural anxiety in the movement from
modernity to postmodernity). See generally Robert P. Morgan, Tradition, Anxiety and the
Current Musical Scene, in AUTHENTICrrY AND EARLY Music 57-83 (Nicholas Kenyon ed.,
1988). Modernity and postmodernity are, of course, epochal notions. The epoch of
Modernity is that period in human history which begins with the Enlightenment and
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commensurables represent the only choices available to feminism is
itself the product of a distorted conception of the relationship between reason and critique. Properly understood, postmodernism
continues to the present. It is marked by an increasing control of nature, the separation
of the subject from tradition, and the growth of reason as the arbiter of human conflict.
Postmodernity is that epoch in which the defining features of Modernity are no longer a
part of the terrain of human existence. Postmodernity is exemplified in culture by the
presence of "pastiche"-the juxtaposition of unrelated elements in various cultural
forms. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the culture of television, see E. ANN
KAPLAN,

ROCKING AROUND THE CLOCK: Music TELEVISION, POSTMODERNISM, &

SUMER CULTURE

CON-

(1987).

Whether or not we are in postmodernity is, of course, very much open to question.
This Article is concerned with the first of the dichotomies set forth above. Its focus is
limited to the question of whether ideas have a life apart from the practices in which they
are embodied. From the perspective of philosophy, the modernist answer is affirmative
and the postmodernist answer negative. Thus, the postmodernist denies that ideas are
autonomous: rather, they "exist," "have a life," or are "viable" only to the extent they
are embodied in practices.
In addition to these qualifications, one must be careful in identifying particular
thinkers as "postmodern." One name often tied to postmodernism is that ofJean-Francois Lyotard, who associates postmodernism with the death of "the metanarrative." See
JEAN-FRANgoIS

LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION:

A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE xxiv

(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) ("I define postmodem as incredulity
toward metanarratives."). Lyotard's argument is nothing less than a wholesale rejection
of the picture of knowledge and justification that has supported much of the discourse of
the human and natural sciences for the last three hundred years. Precisely what does
Lyotard reject? In a word, legitimation. "Legitimation is the process by which a legislator is authorized to promulgate ... a law as a norm." lId at 8. Thus, the question "is
this law valid?" has no point, for the "knowledge" required to answer the question is a
knowledge that can never exist. In postmodernity, legitimation of first-order discourses
(e.g., law and science) by resort to second-order discourses of reason (e.g., philosophy)
is replaced with a picture of knowledge as a move within a game, specifically a "language-game."
It is useful to make the following three observations about languagegames. The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their
own legitimation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between
players (which is not to say that the players invent the rules). The second
is that if there are no rules, there is no game, that even an infinitesimal
modification of one rule alters the nature of the game, that a "move" or
utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not belong to the game they
define. The third remark is suggested by what has just been said: every
utterance should be thought of as a "move" in a game.
Id at 10 (citation omitted). Lyotard's principal focus in attacking the traditional conception of knowledge as rational scrutiny of claims to truth and validity is philosophy. What
Lyotard seeks is the complete displacement (not replacement) of philosophy with knowledge of the pragmatics of interaction. He wants philosophy "forced to relinquish its
legitimation duties." Id. at 41. Legitimation gives way to the agonistic play of the participants as they struggle with one another for control of the game.
Feminism aspires to a metanarrative about gender or patriarchy. For example, "different voice" feminism claims that women speak and think differently than do men, and
that male forms of discourse and modes of understanding suppress their "voice." If
Lyotard is right that the era of the totalizing and legitimating metanarrative is at an end,
then feminism, at least in its totalizing forms, is impossible. Thus, postmodernism poses
a threat to any form of feminist critique that issues from a perspective assuming or presupposing a position outside the (dominant) discourse of (gendered) law.
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poses no threat to feminism. 10 In fact, all that postmodernism
threatens is a conception of reason (the modernist 1 conception)
12
which may have reached the end of its useful life.
After reviewing the broad contours of contemporary feminist
jurisprudence, Part I provides a description of modernism and
postmodernism. The move from modernity to postmodernity is not
depicted as the replacement of one mode of thought with another;
rather, postmodernism is viewed as the unwillingness to be captivated by certain questions that animate modernist habits Of thought.
Part II turns to contemporary feminist jurisprudence. Having made
the argument that the status of postmodernism is central to recent
debates in feminist jurisprudence, the focus is shifted to the work of
three feminists in support of this claim. The work of each feminist
represents a different perspective on the question of postmodernism. For one, feminism is not possible without the modernist project. The second is skeptical of modernism but cannot escape
modernist forms of argumentation. The third openly embraces
postmodernism and uses her stance to criticize the shortcomings of
radical feminists making their arguments from within modernist
rhetorical forms.
Part III considers what a feminist jurisprudence would look like
from the postmodernist perspective. Having moved beyond the
modernist conception of knowledge, the emphasis shifts to the
themes of practice, critique, and localism. This focus leads to a description of feminist jurisprudence as a form of narrative, viewing it
as an enterprise devoted to reconstructing juridical conventions by
rereading them in ways that can be described as "postmodern."

10 The epigram with which this Article begins signals the sense in which
postmodernism and the manifold claims made for it should be understood.
11 I identify modernism with the spirit of the Enlightenment. "In the most general
sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men
from fear and establishing their sovereignty." MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W.
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (John Cumming trans., 1972). Despite the
broad tenor of Horkheimer and Adorno's language, the conception or aspect of modernism that is here identified by the term is quite specific (thus, extrapolation from this
narrow focus is hazardous). The broadest way to frame the modernism with which I
shall be concerned is this: freedom and rationality are ineluctably connected in some
fashion. This idea, which stems from Kantian ethical philosophy, is given various expressions from the eighteenth century to the present. The most basic element in this
view is that the relationship between ethics and reason is one of disclosure: the latter
discloses the former. It is with this specific claim that I shall take issue.
12 It is important to remember that the point of modernist thought, particularly
political thought, was to emancipate humanitas from a non-secular mode of existence that
itself had become obsolete. As the contradictions of modernism mount, modernism too
mav give way to a form of thought, the parameters of which have yet to be defined.
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I
FEMINISM, MODERNITY, AND POSTMODERNITY

A.

The State of Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence

Are women different from men? This seemingly simple question is immediately rendered problematic by further questions.
Given that there are differences, whence come the differences? How
can we know the truth of those differences? These questions in turn
give rise to others addressed in feminist jurisprudence. Is sex identical to gender? Do women have a different psychic constitution
than men?; one that impels them toward care' 3 and compassion 14
rather than argument, contest, and even violence? And where do
our images of women come from? Is gender something with which
we come into the world, or is it produced in our language or culture? 15 These are important questions, and in attempting to answer
them, all manner of contemporary feminist theery has become wedded to the "difference" issue.16
Another question presents itself-call it the question of critique. Underlying the difference question is a host of critique-based
questions regarding epistemology, patriarchy, subordination, and
power. For example, in her critique of rape law, Catharine
MacKinnon accepts that men and women are different.' 7 What
MacKinnon rejects is the elevation into law of the male view of sex.
Rape law has nothing to do with protecting women: to accomplish
that goal, the law would have to look at sex, and rape, from "women's point of view." 1 8 This it refuses to do because the discourse
of law is gendered, and its gender is male. Hence, critique, discourse, and liberation are inextricably woven together.
The project of providing a philosophical account of the differences between men and women has evolved into the "difference"
question. ,Ifmen and women are different, then what are the differences, and how should we take account of them? At this point, the
13 See NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984).
14 See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion and Wisdoa, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011 (1989). For a discussion of the nineteenth century opposition

between reason and feeling, see IRIS M. YOUNG, Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, in THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 92-113 (1990).
15 On this question, see ELIZABETH WILSON, ADORNED IN DREAMS: FASHION AND
MODERNITY 117-33 (1985) (analyzing the role of fashion in the production of gender
identity).

16

For an innovative effort to think through the implications of "difference" in the

context of questions of social justice, see IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990).
17 See MAcKINNON, supra note 7, at 40.
18 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marsm, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
hfrihrdpr" 9 Sr'-'s 635. 644 (1983).
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difference question and the question of critique converge, and the
internal debate in feminism heats up. First comes essentialism. Women are different, and their differences are universal: they include
the mothering impulse, 1 9 biological differences, 20 and the capacity
to nurture. 21 Because of these differences, women should be
treated differently than men. Is implies (or could be made to imply)
ought.
Long feminism's torment, essentialism has fallen on hard
times. 22 As two feminist philosophers recently stated: "[V]estiges
of essentialism have continued to plague feminist scholarship, even
despite the decline of grand theorizing. In many cases ... this represents the continuing subterranean influence of those very mainstream modes of thought and inquiry with which feminists have
wished to break. ' ' 23 If, however, essentialism is abandoned, what
will take its place? 24 One answer is this: a view of "woman" not as
the instantiation of a universal category, but as the product of legal
discourse. 25 Why not do away with the whole idea of the category
"woman" altogether? Perhaps feminists would do better "to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, ambiguity, and multiplicity as well as
19

See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND

THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
20
See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEx:

THE CASE FOR FEMINIST

REvOLUTION (1970).
21
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
22 See Helen Vendler, Feminism and Literature, N.Y. REV., May 31, 1990, at 19, 22.
Feminism's unacknowledged problem, visible from its inception, has
been its ascription of special virtue to women. In its most sentimental
form, feminism assumes that men, as a class, are base and women are
moral; in its angry version, that men are oppressors and women are the
oppressed. This is to ignore what some cooler feminist minds have suspected, that the possession of power, rather than whether one is a woman
or a man, is what determines the act of oppression.
Id.
23
24

Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 1, at 33.
This question arises with great frequency with respect to projects that concep-

tualize feminism along poststructuralist lines. See, e.g., Teresa de Lauretis, The Essence of
the Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist Theory in Italy, the U.S., and
Britain, I DIFFERENCES 3, 9 (1989) ("I would insist that the notion of experience in relation both to social-material practices and to the formation and processes of subjectivity
is a feminist concept, not a poststructuralist one .... ").
25 One feminist summarizes the problem this way:
If there is to be feminism at all, as a movement unique to women, we
must rely on a feminine voice and a feminine "reality" that can be identified as such and correlated with the lives of actual women. Yet all accounts of the Feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid gender identities,
deny the real differences among women (white women have certainly
been reminded of this danger by women of color), and reflect the history
of oppression and discrimination rather than an ideal to which we ought
to aspire.
Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L.
REv 644, 644-45 (1990).
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to expose the roots of our needs for imposing order and structure
no matter how arbitrary and oppressive these needs may be."'26 But
what would this change do to "feminism"? How can feminism be
"something more than a reformist movement" 27 if it gives up the
project of "calling the parish boundaries into question"? 28 In short,
how can there be feminism without a systematic critique of gender
29
relations?
Faced with these questions, contemporary feminist jurisprudence has developed a variety of projects, all of which are aimed at
the development of the tools necessary to critique the gendered discourse of law. Much of this literature is devoted to the development
of feminist methods for use in the critique of doctrine,30 judging,3 1
and practical reasoning.3 2 In the course of this development, a
good deal of attention has been focused on what feminist jurisprudence should "look like." 3 3 To answer this question, one must first
ask what any jurisprudence should look like. This raises further
questions about method, knowledge, and critique. 34 It is also to
raise the question of postmodernism.3 5
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 1, at 56.
Lovibond, supra note 1, at 22.
Id
I owe this formulation of the question to Jack Balkin.
30 See SUSAN EsTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
31 See Judith Resnik, On The Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations Of The Aspirations For Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988).
32 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 854-62. Professor Bartlett embraces method both as
a substantive tool (it will get us closer to the "truth" of things) and as a legitimating
device.
Method matters also because without an understanding of feminist methods, feminist claims in the law will not be perceived as legitimate or "correct." I suspect that many who dismiss feminism as trivial or
inconsequential misunderstand it. Feminists have tended to focus on defending their various substantive positions or political agendas, even
among themselves. Greater attention to issues of method may help to
anchor these defenses, to explain why feminist agendas often appear so
radical (or not radical enough), and even to establish some common
ground among feminists.
As feminists articulate their methods, they can become more aware
of the nature of what they do, and thus do it better. Thinking about
method is empowering. When I require myself to explain what I do, I am
likely to discover how to improve what I earlier may have taken for
granted. In the process, I am likely to become more committed to what it
is that I have improved.
Id at 831.
33 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115 (suggesting that the validity of feminism need not be connected to its distinctiveness).
34 It is also to raise the question of whether the notion of "ideology," so central to
Marxist and Neo-Marxist critiques of political economy, is still viable. For a recent defense of critique's continuing viability in the realm of culturally produced objects, see
JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE 320-27 (1990).
35 See supra text accompanying note 2. See generally CHARLES JENCKS, WHAT IS POSTMODERNISM (1986).
26
27
28
29
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Just as feminists began to develop sophisticated theories of law,
creating a jurisprudence of their own, postmodernism raised the
question of whether a systematic jurisprudence was possible. This
question arose naturally from feminist explorations in the realm of
postmodernity, where issues of gender, sex, and identity are end-*
lessly debated.3 6 These debates are important-even critical-for
feminist jurisprudence. A jurisprudence is no better than the general philosophical positions it assumes.3 7 Thus, there can be no
jurisprudence if there are no answers to questions of truth, justification, critique, knowledge, and normativity. By challenging the modernist stance on these topics, postmodernism necessarily calls into
question the modes, manners, and methods of jurisprudence.
The connection between postmodernism and feminist jurisprudence, then, is determined by whether and to what extent feminist
jurisprudence can tie its future to the future of modernist assumptions about truth, reason, and normativity. With respect to
postmodernism, the stakes for feminist jurisprudence are clear: if
modernism is considered to be at an end, has feminism reached its
terminus as well? This is the question with which this Article is
concerned. Before considering this question, we must take a closer
look at modernism and postmodernism.
B.

Mapping Modernity

Modernism is the form of thought identified with the spirit of
the Enlightenment,3 8 whose familiar story is captured by Jeffrey
Stout's felicitous phrase "the flight from authority."3 9 Spurred on
by the power of science and its control over nature, philosophy replaced the medieval emphasis on custom, ritual, authority, and cos-

36 For a recent collection of papers on the social aspects of gender construction,
see THE SOCIAl. CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds.,
1991).
37
See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 69 (1989) ("The concept of
jurisprudence presumes an identifiable unity of law, hence basic principles of justice,
rights, or equity are presumed to underpin all aspects of law.").
38 As previously mentioned, the focus of this Article is on a small aspect of the vast
picture of modernism. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
39

See JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE

QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 2-3 (1981).

[M]odern thought was born in a crisis of authority, took shape in flight
from authority, and aspired from the start to autonomy from all traditional influence whatsoever,.. . the quest for autonomy was also an attempt to deny the historical reality of having been influenced by tradition;
and.., this quest therefore could not but fail.
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mology with a self-conscious preoccupation with legitimacy, 40
progress, civility, rationality, and human emancipation. 4 1
Modernism is exemplified by three axes which, together, pro42
vide a three-dimensional perspective.
1. Epistemological Foundationalism: the view that knowledge
can only be justified to the extent it rests on indubitable
foundations;
2. Theory of Language: language has one of two functions-it
represents ideas or states of affairs, or it expresses the attitudes of
the speaker;
3. Individual and Community: "society" is best understood as
43
an aggregation of "social atoms."
These three components of the modernist picture should not be
viewed as simply parts of a whole. Each represents not merely an
idea or element in a picture, but an axis which, considered with the
others, enables one to see a broad range of theoi'es as all of a piece.
As the label suggests, epistemological foundationalism is an
epistemological axis, with foundationalism 44 at one end and skepticism 4 5 at the other. Perhaps the most representative rationalist
40

See

HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE

(Robert M. Wal-

lace trans., 1983) (defending the idea of progress as a secular notion).
.41 If any single theme runs through the whole of modernity it is the idea of autonomy. In politics, the subject is free to decide her own conception of the good; in art, the
work of art must be allowed to "speak for itself." Literature has the same hopes for
itself, as does law. When the tradition starts to slip away, and the autonomy of the text is
thereby threatened, the anxiety may be expressed in terms of fetishization. For a discussion of this phenomenon in music, see Howard M. Brown, Pedantry or Liberation?A Sketch
of the HistoricalPerformance Movement, in AUTHEI=rrITY AND EARLY Music, supra note 9, at
27-56.
42
See Nancey Murphy & James W. McClendon, Jr., Distinguishing Modern and
Postmodern Theologies, 5 MODERN THEOLOGY 199 (1989) (describing modernity by reference to three axes). See also Nancey Murphy, Scientific Realism and PostmodernPhilosophy, 41
BRrr. J. PHIL. Sci. 291 (1990) (describing postmodern philosophy of science). One
could reasonably take issue with many aspects of this representation of modernism. The
story of modernism is far more complex than this simple representation of its genealogy
can depict. These difficulties notwithstanding, this representation is heuristically defensible in that important aspects of modernism are identified and isolated for study. In
short, used with appropriate caution, this picture of modernist thought is useful.
43
Murphy, supra note 42, at 292.
44
See D.W. HAMLYN, THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 10 (1970).
There is a tendency to think of the corpus of knowledge as a building that
is rising upward and that those who increase the stock of knowledge are
building additional stories on to the existing fabric. If the foundations
are not secure the whole building will eventually come crashing to the
ground.
45 , See id. at 7-8 ("Philosophical skepticism ...raises fundamental doubts about the
possibility of knowing anything at all."). For a broad essay on skepticism in the tradition
of analytic philosophy, seeJohn Skorupski, The Intelligibility of Skepticism, in THE ANALYTIC
TRADITION 1-29 (David Bell & Neil Cooper eds., 1990).
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foundationalist 4 6 is Ren6 Descartes. 4 7 In essence, Descartes saw the
problem of knowledge as a problem about certainty. Separating belief from illusion required a method, and in response to that need,
Descartes invented the "method of doubt."4 8 This process of validating a belief required that the belief be submitted to an inner
(mental) tribunal wherein it was interrogated. An idea that survived
this process of questioning earned the label "clear and distinct":
that which could not be doubted-the indubitable-was valid and,
thus, "knowledge. '4 9 Descartes' emphasis on method and validation led, not surprisingly, to the valorization of mathematics, science, and geometry, for it was in these areas that he found that
which was most certain: axiom, system, and deduction. 50
The other foundationalist approach to knowledge is empiricism. This theory replaces the rationalist emphasis on the formal
relations between ideas with an appeal to our ordinary, commonsense understanding of experience. 5 1 When we see an object, we
have a retinal impression of a thing that exists in space and time; to
put it more colloquially, we have an experience of another body.
Providing an explanation for such an experience (that is, demonstrating how it is possible and what having that experience involves)

46 For the rationalist, the flux of experience cannot be understood without resort to
ideas, for it is through ideas that experience is organized and knowledge achieved. But
which ideas are correct and which illusory? Rationalists of all stripes take this question
seriously; however, the way in which they take it seriously cannot go unnoticed. The
rationalist has no need to consult other people in answering the question "How do I
know my beliefs are true?" With introspection, such an individual can gain knowledge
of the world through the methodological discernment of ideas. True beliefs are those
that accord with clear and distinct ideas. In short, "one could define rationalism as the
view that knowledge about the world is the development of what, in some sense, we
already know in the form of clear, distinct, and mutually consistent ideas present to our
consciousness." ROBERT ACKERMANN, DATA, INSTRUMENTS AND THEORY 7 (1985).
47 For an interesting essay on Descartes' account of subjectivity and the relationship of his thought to modernity, see DALIA JUDOVITZ, SUBJECTIVITY AND REPRESENTATION IN DESCARTES: THE ORIGINS OF MODERNrrY (1988).

48 For an excellent discussion of the place of Descartes' method of doubt in modernist arguments over validity and belief, see ROBERT B. PIPPIN, MODERNISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 23-25 (1991).
49

See Roy BOYNE, FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA: THE OTHER SIDE OF REASON 42 (1990).

For Descartes, when the understanding perceives something clearly and
distinctly, we can be sure that it perceives truly, because God, who is not
a deceiver, gave us the powers that we have, and it is inconceivable that
where we perceive something clearly God intended that we should be
deceived. It follows from this that corporeal things "possess all the
properties which I clearly and distinctly understand."
Id. (citation omitted).

50 See Ren6 Descartes, Discourse on Method, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 12
(Lowell Bair trans., 1961).
51

See HAMLYN, supra note 44. at 34.
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without referring to anything "in" the mind is the gravamen of empiricism. 52 Empiricism is foundationalist in that, for the empiricist,
verification and justification, telling whether something is true and
backing up one's claims about what is true, must rely eventually
upon the evidence of one's senses; not in the first instance,
maybe, but at the end of the day. What else could we appeal to, to
tell us whether something is true, than the evidence of our senses?
This is a good sound empiricist question. So the evidence of our
senses is what we start from when we need to construct ajustification for our beliefs, on this approach. 53
Skepticism 54 is not necessarily tied to either the rationalist or
the empiricist strand of foundationalism. It is therefore a mistake to
characterize the skeptic as one who denies the rationalist or the empiricist account of knowledge. The skeptic does not deny that what
is described as knowledge is in fact knowledge. Rather, the skeptic
denies that we ever have knowledge. For examiple, David Hume
believed that, although we had to assume its existence, we could not
prove the existence of the external world. 5 5 All we have on which to
base our knowledge of causation is a constant conjunction of sense
impressions. These impressions-raw input from the outside
56
world-are the only available bases for knowledge.
52

See DAVID

HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND THE PRIN-

CIPLES OF MORALS

49-50 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1975) (noting that ideas in the mind are
generated by sense impressions).
53 JONATHAN DANCY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY 86

(1985).
54 The great critic of skepticism is, of course, Immanuel Kant. Kant takes seriously
the skeptical claim that we can never "know" the truth of any proposition, advancing a
"critical philosophy" of transcendental idealism. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON (Norman Kemp Smith ed. & trans., 1929); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACnCAL REASON (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1956); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
(Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987). A recent treatment of Kant's theory of knowledge is
found in HUBERT SCHWYZER, THE UNITY OF UNDERSTANDING (1990). For a brilliant analysis of the aporias ofjudgment, and of Kant's solution to them, see HOWARD CAYGILL,
THE ART OF JUDGEMENT (1989). For a breathtakingly quick run through the whole of
Kantian critical philosophy, see GILLES DELEUZE, KANT's CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Hugh
Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam trans., 1984).
55 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 187 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1888) (We may well ask, "What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in
vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in
all our reasonings.").
56
Modern philosophy had wrestled with the relationship between epistemology
and vision long before the Vienna Positivists turned their attention to the matter. See 2
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION (E.FJ. Payne trans.,
1958) (criticizing Kant's aesthetics and epistemology for inattention to the physiology of
apperception). For a discussion of vision as a theme in modernity, seeJONATHAN CRARY,
TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1990). In our own century, the idea that knowledge is built up from simple ele-

ments in sensory experience was taken to new heights by the Vienna Circle. Led by the
philosopher Rudolf Carnap, the Circle advanced a wide-ranging program for the consti-
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In sum, knowledge on the modernist view is foundational,
whether derived from rationalism or empiricism. For modernists,
the only question is whether you believe in foundations or are dubious of the foundational enterprise. "Taking epistemology seriously" does not require a commitment to one end of the axis or the
other: rather it merely requires that one be captivated by the questions that animate the poles of the axes.
The two poles of the language axis represent the two functions
of language. Language either refers to objects in the world or is
expressive of the attitudes, preferences, or emotions of the speaker.
One pole, representationalism, is closely linked with epistemological foundationalism. If language is a medium for referring to objects in the world, then knowledge of what something is can be
gleaned from that object's representation in language. The point of
studying language is to study the ways in which words refer to
things.
In their heyday, modernist philosophers advanced representational theories of language that viewed words as place holders or
stand-ins for things. 57 In the twentieth century, the pre-1929 work
of Ludwig Wittgenstein is the paradigmatic expression of such theories, establishing the program of "logical atomism," which emphatution of knowledge in fields as diverse as philosophy, sociology, architecture, and language studies. Underlying the subject-matter divisions of the Circle's broad program
was a simple yet powerful approach to knowledge, one with philosophical, cultural and
political dimensions. Peter Galison describes the details of the program in two seemingly disparate arenas: science and architecture. He notes that the Vienna Positivists'
program
sought to instantiate a modernism emphasizing what I will call "transparent construction," a manifest building up from simple elements to all
higher forms that would, by virtue of the systematic constructional program itself, guarantee the exclusion of the decorative, mystical, or metaphysical. There was a political dimension to this form of construction: by
basing it on simple, accessible units, they hoped to banish incorporation
of nationalist or historical features.
From simple observation reports ("protocol statements") and logical
connectives (such as "if/then," "or," "and"), the logical positivists
sought to ground a "scientific," antiphilosophical philosophy that would
set all reliable knowledge on strong foundations and isolate it from the
unreliable. Since all valid inferences would be built out of these basic
statements, the sciences would be unified by their shared starting points.
For their part, the Bauhausler hoped to use scientific principles to combine primitive color relations and basic geometrical forms to eliminate
the decorative and create a new antiaesthetic aesthetic that would prize
functionality. So close had the two groups come in their shared vision of
modernism that, when the Bauhaus reconvened as the New Bauhaus in
Chicago after fleeing the Nazis, the New Bauhaus imported the Vienna
Circle's logical positivism as a fundamental component of its basic design
program.
Peter Galison, Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism, 16 CRITICAL

709, 710-11 (1990).
See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY

INQUIRY

57

AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE

257-312 (1979).
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sizes the reduction of sentence elements to their constituent parts in
the world.5 8 In describing Wittgenstein's theory, David Pears explains the method this way:
We evidently do succeed in using this language to describe the
world, but how is this done? [Wittgenstein's] answer is that we
succeed only because there is a fixed grid of possible combinations of objects to which the structure of our language conforms.
The grid must exist and connections must be made with it if language is going to work. But it clearly does work and so the metaphysical conclusions follow. 59
Viewing language as the instantiation of some structure or grid is a
way of answering the question, "How does language represent the
world?" A related, and for law more important, question is, "How
can one see a variety of situations as being the same thing?" This
question focuses on the role language plays in connecting a variety
of factual contexts which, despite their differenczs, can be said to be
60
the same.
If language is not a means of referring, then what else can it be?
If one accepts the representationalist claim that language does refer
to things in the world, then what becomes of ethical discourse? The
Vienna Circle recommended that ethics, together with the whole of
continental philosophy, be dismissed as "bad poetry." 6' On this
view, the only alternative is to develop an account of language as a
mode of expression. Thus, moral judgments are not "true," and do
58 LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, TRAcTATus LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness trans., 1974).
59 1 DAVID PEARS, THE FALSE PRISON: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WITrGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY 6 (1987).
60 For example, an offer can be accepted orally, in writing, by telegram, by smoke
signal, and so on. What makes these different ways of acting "the same thing," that is,
"acceptance"? Some modem philosophies of language unpack the idea that different
contexts are "the same thing" by isolating those elements that are shared. There exists,
it is argued, an "essence" that can be captured by language, mirrored in thought, and
which reflects the external world. The following passage explicates this view:
The meaning of words like "death," therefore, is not to be found in some
set of conventions; meaning is neither a set of standard examples, nor a

set of properties conventionally assigned to a symbol. The meaning of a
word like "death" is only to be found in the best scientific theory we can
muster about the true nature of that kind of event. By assuming that
there are such true natures of natural kinds of things, the theory of meaning presupposed by our usage is aptly termed a realist theory of meaning.
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 300
(1985). For a similar view, consciously adopting a semantics of "natural kinds," see
David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation,andJudicialReview, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
105, 111-12 (1988). For a critique of Brink's position, see Dennis M. Patterson, Realist
Semantics and Legal Theory, 2 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 175 (1989).
61
For an entertaining summary of the tenets of the Vienna Circle and its program
of logical positivism, see DONALD PALMER, LOOKING AT PHILOSOPHY: THE UNBEARABLE
HEAVINESS OF PHILOSOPHY MADE LIGHTER 330-38 (1988).
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not "represent" the world; rather, they are "expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or
62
evaluative in character."
Finally, we address the third modernist axis, whose poles are
individualism and collectivism. To the individualist, society is composed simply of "social atoms," 63 each endowed with needs and
desires the existence and identity of which are known .(internally) to
each. 6 4 Political economy is best understood from the perspective
of individual motivation. 6 5 The individualist eschews all talk of public values, group norms, or "structures." Methodological individualism is the explanatory model for understanding.
The collectivist counters that the class to which a person belongs is far more foundational than the individual. Class is one of
many constitutive social facts that shape the individual, making her
what she is. At its most radical, collectivism maintains that the individual is not in control of her own fate, but is produced by forces
beyond her control. Agents are individually capable of making free
and rational decisions with respect to their preferences only to the
extent they are able to become aware of and break free from the
66
structures that shape their choices.
Together, these three axes yield the following picture of mod67
em thought.
62
63

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 11 (1981).
See generally ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 1-27 (1987) (dis-

cussing the ontological and conceptual foundations of liberalism, and specifically, the
theory of individuality as social atomism).
64 There are two "spaces" that together compose the individual. The realm of
right, which is created by reason, is divided into two spheres, the public and the private.
The public sphere is one of right. In this realm, private action is restricted to the extent
it impacts on the right of others to act similarly. The private sphere is the realm of
individual choice in actions which, from the perspective of the individual, are good.
This account of the relationship between reason, agency, and normativity was first established by Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS (HJ. Paton trans., 1964). For a discussion of this perspective in the light of the
postmodern critique of agent-centered reason, see JOHN McGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM
AND ITS CRITICS 31-43 (1991).
65

See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 119 (1970).

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Id.
66

For an application of argument to contract theory, see Jay M. Feinman, The Sig-

nificance of Contract Theory, 58 U. GIN. L. REv. 1283 (1990).
67 This diagram is taken from Murphy & McClendon, supra note 42, at 199. As
mentioned above, our focus with respect to modernism is on the question "In what does
knowledge consist?" This Article advances the position that knowledge is the demonstrable ability to move within a linguistic practice. This view represents both a substantive position on knowledge and an alternative to views of knowledge labeled as
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Postmodern Thought

Postmodern thought may be defined as "any mode of thought
that departs from the three modern axes described above without
reverting to premodern categories." 68 It must be emphasized that
postmodernism does not involve the reconstitution of any or all of
these axes. Postmodern projects depart from these axes, seeking to
rethink the problems from a perspective that is nonuniversalist or
"local" in character, holistic, and discursive.6 9 As we shall see, the
movement from the modernist picture of knowledge to the
postmodern view of the world took place through a gradual shift in
perspective. Not surprisingly, the shift began on modernist terms.
The story of science from the seventeenth to the twentieth century is best told as the rise of experimentation as the central focus of
philosophical debates over the ground of knowledge.70 This emmodernist or postmodernist. One can be skeptical of claims that we are in postmodernity without forsaking a position in the modern-postmodern debate about knowledge.
68 Murphy & McClendon, supra note 42, at 199. These premodern categories are
authority (specificaly, religious authority) and cosmology-an understanding of the
world that explains the existence of the'universe by postulating the existence of a deity.
See ANTHONY FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 77-79 (2d ed. 1979). For a broader

version of the story of modernism, see STEPHEN ToULMIN, CosMopoLIs: THE HIDDEN
AGENDA OF MODERNITY (1990); MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT'S SOLID MELTS INTO AIR:
THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY (1988). For a recent work concentrating on the cultural
aspects of postmodernism, see FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL

LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991). An excellent bibliography on postmodernism is
found in AFTER THE FUTURE: POSTMODERN TIMES AND PLACES 333-50 (Gary Shapiro ed.,

1990).
69 I will argue in Part III that this position is best described as "narrational."
70 This is only a recent realization, first brought to light in ACKERMANN, supra note
46. See also PETER GALISON, How EXPERIMNTs END (1987) (reviewing experiments on
gyromagnetic effects and the production of scientific knowledge). The usual story of the
progress of scientific knowledge goes like this:
It has become usual in recent history of science to rehearse the shortcomings of standard textbook presentations of scientific progress: observations not in accord with previous conceptions of the world accumulate
until they force a new set of theoretical views on the scientific community.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

270

[Vol. 77:254

phasis is due to the empiricist basis of positivism, the most influential theory of scientific knowledge. 7 1 During the 1950s and 1960s,
the positivist picture of knowledge received close scrutiny and was
found wanting. The first chink in the positivist armor resulted from
a blow that came from within positivism's own ranks, dealt by the
philosopher and logician W.V.O. Quine.7 2 In Quine's view, the idea
of knowledge as a process of building from the simple to the complex, as well as the concomitant notion that knowledge is a matter of
resonance between word (concept) and world, had to be scrapped.
In their place, Quine substituted holism. This theory maintains that
the truth of any one statement or proposition is a function not of its
relationship to the world, but of the degree to which it "hangs to73
gether" with everything else we take to be true.
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most
casual matters of geography and history to. the profoundest laws
of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a manmade fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.
Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose
boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at
the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field.
Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. ReEvaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of
others, because of their logical interconnections-the logical laws
being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must re~valuate some others, which may be statements
logically connected with the first or may be the statements of logiEven now it is not hard to find physics textbooks that recount the origins
of special relativity in terms of the inexorable march of optical ether-drift
experiments. According to these potted versions of history, Einstein
"simply" generalized the clear observational fact that motion with respect
to the ether could not be observed. In this way the strength of physical
argumentation is rhetorically linked to its connection with observation
(or experiment) and the historical sequence is described in such a way as
to enhance the role of experience and denigrate the corresponding theoretical analysis.
Peter Galison, History, Philosophy, and the Central Metaphor, 2 Sc. CONTEXT 197, 198-99
(1988).
71

See DAvID OLDROYD, THE ARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 168-262 (1986) (tracing the ori-

gins of the positivist model of knowledge).
72

See WILLARD V.0.

QUINE,

Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL PoiNr OF

20-46 (1953) (arguing against the idea of a "basic" unit of knowledge and urging
instead a view of knowledge as embedded in "the whole of science."). See also Galison,
supra note 70, at 203 ("Quine strongly opposed the total separation of observation from
other forms of knowledge; for him, all were up for evaluation."); Murphy, supra note 42,
at 294 ("Quine not only replaced the foundationalist theory of knowledge with a holist
account, but also provided a new picture or metaphor-that of a web or network of
beliefs-to replace the 'layer-cake' model."). For a very quick tour through Quine's
thought, see Hilary Putnam, Misling, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, April 21, 1988, at 11-13.
73 QUINE. supra note 72, at 42-43.
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cal connections themselves. But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience; that there
is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reivaluate in
the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of
the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium
affecting the field as a whole.
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical
content of an individual statement--especially if it is a statement
at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic
statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be
held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments
74
elsewhere in the system.
Quine's picture of knowledge of the external world changed the
way people thought -about the construction of knowledge. His
breakthrough was to see knowledge not as a matter of foundations-building up from bedrock-but as a function of one's ability
to move about within a holistic web, be it a web of theory or of intersubjective practice. It is in this shift from simplicity, reductionism,
and foundations to holism, network, and totality that Quine's epistemology earns the description "postmodern." 75 Quine's embrace of
holism, together with his pragmatism on questions of truth, 76 invites
comparison with the referential theory of language, the second of
the three aspects of modernism displaced in postmodernity.
Language is the central preoccupation of contemporary philosophy. 77 But how does language work? Are we lost in the labyrinth
of language, as Nietzsche thought, 78 or is language simply a medium
through which the world is represented (or, to put the emphasis
where it should be, represented)? Does language have the power to
represent nature as it is in itself, sub specie aeternitatis? That is, in
language do words represent states of affairs in the world in such a
way that the truth of any proposition may be discerned by comparing the proposition with the state of affairs it depicts?
74

Id.

See Murphy, supra note 42, at 294 ("As candidate for the title of postmodern
epistemologist I nominate Willard V.0. Quine.").
76 For a discussion of this aspect of Quine's thought, see CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY,
QUINE: LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALITY 50-58 (1988).
77
See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiii-xlvii (1982) (providing a
wide-ranging account of the function of language in philosophical discourse).
78
See Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, in PHILOSOPHY AND
TRUTH: SELECTIONS FROM NIETZSCHE's NOTEBOOKS OF THE EARLY 1870's 79-100 (Daniel
75

Breazeale ed. & trans., 1979).
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Postmodern approaches to language 7 9 do not present arguments against the modern, representationalist view.8 0 Rather,
postmodernist conceptions of the word-world relation see the modernist picture of propositional, representational truth8 as unintelligible-as a project that never gets off the ground. 82 The focus of
79
For a discussion of the relationship between language and representation in
modernism and postmodernism, see ScoTT LASH, SOCIOLOGY OF PosTmODERNISM 12

(1990) ("Modernism... had clearly differentiated and autonomized the roles of signifier, signified, and referent. Post-modernization on the contrary problematizes these distinctions, and especially the status and relationship of signifier and referent, or put
another way, representation and reality.").
80
Rather, the postmodern emphasis is on the question of what can be done with
language. See 2 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (ESSAYS ON HEIDEGGER AND
OTHERS) 58 (1991).
[Donald] Davidson's account of human linguistic behavior takes for
granted, as the later Wittgenstein also did, that there are no linguistic
entities which are intrinsically relationless-nonewhich, like the "simple
names" of the Tractatus, are by nature relata. But Davidson's holism is
more explicit and thoroughgoing than Wittgenstein's, and so its antiphilosophical consequences are more apparent. Whereas in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein still toys with the idea of a distinction
between the empirical and the grammatical, between nonphilosophical
and philosophical inquiry, Davidson generalizes and extends Quine's refusal to countenance either a distinction between necessary and contingent truth or a distinction between philosophy and science. Davidson
insists that we not think either of language in general or a particular language (say, English or German) as something which has distinct edges,
something which forms a bounded whole and can thus become a distinct
object of study or of philosophical theorizing.
Id Rorty's claim that "Davidson's holism is more explicit and thoroughgoing than
Wittgenstein's" is a red herring. Davidson's account of understanding is, in the vocabulary here in use, thoroughly modernist and empiricist-a far cry from the holist and
pragmatist reading Rorty advances. The central reason Rorty's characterization of Davidson's position cannot be sustained is that, for Davidson, understanding is a matter of
an empirical theory. See Donald Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF

DONALD DAVIDSON 433-446 (Er-

nest LePore ed., 1986).
[C]laims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not ...
claims about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they
claims about the details of the inner workings of some part of the brain.
They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter. We cannot describe what
an interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive theory of a certain
sort.
Id. at 438. Thus, understanding another person is a matter of having a theory about the
sounds that emanate from her mouth. These sounds are interpreted by reference to a
grid which is recursively mapped onto the audible output of the interlocutor. This,
Rorty, claims, is pragmatism! For a Wittgensteinian critique of the pretensions and
shortfalls of Davidson's account of understanding, see STEPHEN MULHALL, ON BEING IN
THE WORLD: WITrGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER ON SEEING ASPECTS 91-122 (1990).
81
For a discussion of modernity, representation, and reason, see Adam B. Seligman, Towards a Reinterpretation of Modernity in an Age of Postmodernity, in THEORIES OF
POSTMODERNrrY 117-35 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1990).
82
SeeJOSEPH RoUSE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER 154 (1987).

[The Realist] takes as already determined both the way the world is and
our understanding of how our interpretations take it to be. The realist of
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the dispute is the modernist theory of correspondence, specifically,
the Sentence-Truth-World relation. To put it in a nutshell, the
postmodern alternative replaces the modernist picture of SentenceTruth-World with an account of understanding that emphasizes
practice, warranted assertability, and pragmatism.8 3
In synthesizing the work of Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
and Davidson, Richard Rorty has rethought American Pragmatism. 8 4 His work, which ranges across areas as divergent as philosophy of mind and political theory, repeatedly returns to the argument
course recognizes that we do not know in advance how the world is. But
once we have some definite interpretations of the world, we can use them
as the basis for our actions, which in turn test the adequacy of our interpretations. If our actions fail t6 achieve their aims, something must be
wrong with the interpretations they were based on. If our actions succeed, this success of course does not entail that their underlying interpretations do accord with the reality they interpret. But if a wide variety of
actions in differing circumstances generally succeed, the best explanation
for their success is that those interpretations at least approximately accord with the way those objects really are. But where do we acquire our
understanding of what our various interpretations do say about the world
and of what would count as success in our actions? The realist needs to
give some account of understanding such that we can understand how
our interpretations take the world to be independent of how the world
actually is. Otherwise the alleged independence of object and interpretation can never get off the ground. Sentences and practices do not have
ready-made meanings, nor do they acquire meaning by convention.
(How could the parties involved understand what they were agreeing to?)
They acquire meaning only in their performance or use.
Id
83 The following summary of the cumulative effect of Quine, the later Wittgenstein,
and like-minded philosophers speaks to this point.
When it comes to deciding between theories constructed within different
conceptual schemes it is possible in Quine's view to have a situation of
under-determination-that is, of there being no factually objective way to
decide between them. Because ontology is relative to conceptual schemes
there is no decisive fact of the matter. But Quine did wish to emphasize
the importance of empirical enquiry to our understanding of the world.
Empirical enquiry takes place at the boundaries of holistic networks or
structures of theory-where they meet the world-and those boundaries
gradually change, so altering the conceptual structure, but not in any
sudden or pervasive way.
A corollary of this position was a radically different conception of
epistemology: seeing it not as the reconstruction of first principles of all
knowledge, being transcendent of particular discourses, but rather as psychology, being the study of particular acts or behavioural patterns of knowing.
This fundamental questioning of the nature of epistemology, associated also with the later work of Wittgenstein and to some extent with the
later work of [Rudolf) Carnap, had a profound but unfortunate effect. In
Quine's words, it "loosed a wave .

.

. of epistemological nihilism", re-

flected partly, as he says, in a tendency "to belittle the role of evidence
and to accentuate cultural relativism."
CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL HISTORY 73 (1986) (citation omitted).
84
By "American Pragmatism" I refer to the thought of, among others,John Dewey,
Charles S. Peirce, and William James.
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that the modernist approach to truth is simply not worth the effort
to keep it afloat. Rorty summarizes his position this way:
For the pragmatist, the notion of "truth" as something "objective" is just a confusion between
(I) Most of the world is as it is whatever we think about it
(that is, our beliefs have very limited causal efficacy)
and
(II) There is something out there in addition to the world
called "the truth about the world" (what [William]
James sarcastically called "this tertium quid intermediate between the facts per se, on the one hand, and all
knowledge of them, actual or potential, on the other").
The pragmatist wholeheartedly assents to (I)-not as an article of
metaphysical faith but simply as a belief that we have never had
any reason to doubt-and cannot make sense of (II). When the
realist tries to explain (II) with
(III) The truth about the world consists in a relation of
"correspondence" between certain sentences (many of
which, no doubt, have yet to be formulated) and the
world itself
the pragmatist can only fall back on saying, once again, that many
centuries of attempts to explain what "correspondence" is have
failed ....

85

Risking repetition, it must be emphasized that the modernist
picture of successful communication is not being replaced with another explanatory picture. The postmodern approach to language
eschews advancing explanations in favor of describing localized linguistic practices. Wittgenstein's later approach to language8 6 is revolutionary8 7 because his attack on modernist philosophical methods
breaks down the distinction between explanation and the phenomenon being explained. All understanding occurs in language.8 8 LanRORTY, supra note 77, at xxvi.
86 I have detailed the parameters of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy and its importance for law in Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith
Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335, 352-73 (1988);
Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability and DiscretionaryAcceleration: Of Llewellyn.
Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169 (1989).
87 For a discussion of Wittgensteinian language philosophy in the context of modernism and postmodernism, see WELLMER, supra note 9, at 78 ("Wittgenstein's skeptical
question is: 'How can I know what I am talking about? How can I know what I mean?'
Language philosophy's critique destroys the subject as author and as the final judge of
his meaning and intentions.").
88 This view disclaims the notion that "understanding" can occur in any private
sense. Owing to its character as a public medium, language-and, thus, meaning-can
never be relegated to the private realm. For a discussion of this point in the context of
the philosophy of consciousness, see ERNST TUGENDHAT, SELF-CoNscIOUSNESS AND SELF85

DETERMINATION 77-97 (Paul Stern trans., 1986) (discussing Wittgenstein on private lan-

guage and its relationship to self-consciousness).
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guage is the universal medium within which we think, act, and
understand. The idea that language "corresponds" to something
outside itself can never be fleshed out, because all talk about language itself remains use of language. No part of language can be torn
from the whole and valorized as a meta-language, super-language,
or "language about language." Wittgenstein addressed this matter
in his first recorded thoughts about the language-world relation:
But is language the only language?
Why should there not be a mode of expression through which I
can talk about language in such a way that it can appear to me in
co-ordination with something else?
Suppose that music were such a mode of expression: then it
is at any rate characteristic of science that no musical themes can
occur in it.

i myself only write sentences down here. And why?
89
How is language unique?
So what does all of this mean for truth? If the modernist conception of truth is abandoned, are we not left with abject relativism?90 Is not every claim to truth, every description of a state of
89 LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, NOTEBOOKS 1914-1916 52e (G.H. von Wright ed.,
G.E.M. Anscombe ed. & trans., 1969).
90 For a recent discussion of this theme, see RobertJ. Lipkin, Skepticism and the New
Fuzziness, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1990) (purporting to go "beyond fuzziness" in ethics
and endorsing "moderate [healthy?] skepticism in normative discourse"). For a more
partisan discussion of the relationship between epistemology, realism, and relativism in
the light cf recent debates in interpretive theory see Michael S. Moore, The Intepretive
Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). The "realist"
ontology and epistemology Moore advocates is based on a model of science whose heyday was the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its last gasp was uttered by Carl
Hempel in the formation of the hypothetico-deductive model of truth. See CARL G.
HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF

SCIENCE (1965). The empiricist proclivities of Hempelian method impel those blinded
by its promise of objectivity and right representation to ignore the role of scientific practices and communities in the production of scientific knowledge. Of course, after Kuhn,
few in the philosophy of science are as enthusiastic about realism in science as Moore is
about realism in law or ethics. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIETrIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). For a recent, intelligent, and quite lively discussion of the current state of the philosophy of science, see LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM
(1990) (narrating an imaginary dialogue between representatives of key positions in
twentieth century philosophy and science, including those of Kuhn and Hempel).
In normative discourse, the realist view that Moore advocates assumes the following
critical posture when describing positions that, in this Article, would be described as
postmodernist:
Telling us we must choose and that some choices will seem better than
others, without giving any reasons why we should choose one way or the
other or why the "seeming-better" should be taken to be better, does not
engage us [read "does not engage me, (Moore)"]. Such suggestions are
empty in the way that noncognitivist and existential ethics are always
empty. For what it is worth, here in the realm of the noncognitivist,
Rorty's world does not seem better to me. It seems a barren place in
which all arguments are made only by pulling oneself out of deep existen-
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affairs, as good or acceptable as any other? This is what the purveyors of "truth" would have us believe. The fact that we cannot
demonstrate how language "cuts reality at the joints" 91 does not
mean that we cannot come up with better or worse ways of carrying
92
on our practices. This, at least, is the claim to be sustained.
We saw earlier that in the modernist picture of knowledge, the
individual controls her own fate. This picture presupposes "that
any individual (given the basic sensory and intellectual equipment)
is as competent as any other to form justified beliefs and speak the
language."19 3 To attain knowledge, the individual need not have
contact with another self. Even when isolated from a community, an
individual is capable of separating true from false beliefs. As
Descartes demonstrated, all that is required is the right method,
since truth and method are inextricably linked.
Postmodernism, on the contrary, challenges the primacy of the
individual.9 4 The postmodern conception of individuality casts the
individual not as the subject in control of discourse, but as an artitial nausea, itself possible only by bad-faith forgetfulness that all arguments are rhetorical substitutes for the bullets one either does not
possess or is unwilling to use.
Moore, supra at 904.
Moore's critique of Rorty utterly fails to come to terms with the philosophical
problems that lead to the characterization of truth Rorty advances. Moore wants to
marry truth to something that is mind-independent (for Moore, essences), and then create an epistemology that explains things, objects, properties, or relations and their representation in language. This is a failed project, as such diverse philosophers as Quine,
Davidson, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Heidegger, and Putnam have shown. (Query: Are they
all then existentialists?) What Moore refuses to see is that "[t]rying to make meaning
accessible [on realist terms] has made truth inaccessible." Donald Davidson, A Coherence
Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 80, at 313. By
tying meaning to "the given" ("moral essences" for example) and truth to justification
(here, an unexplicated notion of "best theory"), Moore embraces skepticism. What is
the solution?
[T]he thing to do is to marry truth and meaning to nothing and nobody
but each other. The resulting marriage will be so intimate a relationship
that a theory will be a theory of meaning, and conversely. But that theory
will be of no use to a representationalist epistemology, nor to any other
sort of epistemology. It will be an explanation of what people do, rather
than of a non-causal, representing, relation in which they stand to nonhuman entities.
Richard Rorty, Representation, Social Practice, and Truth, 54 PHIL. STUD. 215, 219 (1988).
91
RICHARD RORTY, Texts and Lumps, in I OBJECTIvrrY, RELATIVISM AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 80 (1991).
92 This claim is defended in Part II. See infra notes 231-91 and accompanying text.
93
94

Murphy, supra note 42, at 295.
See generally MANFRED FRANK, WHAT IS NEOSTRUCTURALISM? 362-454, passim (Sab-

ine Wilke & Richard Gray trans., 1989) (reviewing the major theories and arguments of
postmodernism); PAUL SMITH, DISCERNING THE SUBJECT (1988) (focusing on "the subject" as a product of discourse). For a piece that gets to the heart of what is and is not at
stake in the debate over the subject, seeJohn Smith, The Transcendence of the Individual, 19
DIACRITICS 80 (1989) (reviewing leading texts on the postmodern constitution of the
subject). See also DAVID CARROLL, THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION: THE LANGUAGES OF THE-
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fact produced by discourse. In applying this concept to feminism,
Judith Butler makes the point this way:
My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the
subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of
the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the
premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood
as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple
refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for
emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from "women"
whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits
of identity politics. 95
But if identity, specifically sexual or gender identity, does not
exist prior to practice, then from whence does identity issue? The
answer, as we have seen, is "the community of discourse." 96 What
does this mean? Butler explains:
The antifoundationalist approach to coalition politics assumes
neither that "identity" is a premise nor that the shape of meaning
of a coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its achievement.
Because the articulation of an identity within available cultural
terms instates a definition that forecloses in advance the emergence of new identity concepts in and through politically gauged
actions, the foundationalist tactic cannot take the transformation
of expansion of existing identity concepts as a normative goal.
Moreover, when agreed-upon identities or agreed-upon dialogic
structures, through which already established identities are communicated, no longer constitute the theme or subject of politics,
then identities can come into being and dissolve depending on the
concrete practices that constitute them. Certain political practices
institute identities on a contingent basis in order to accomplish
whatever aims are new. Coalitional politics requires neither an exORY AND THE STRATEGIES OF FIcTION

(1982) (essaying the constitution of the subject vis-

a-vis critical theory).
95

JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY

(1990).
96

See Murphy, supra note 42, at 295.
In postmodern thought... the community plays an indispensable role. It

is the community that must decide when to take anomalous facts seriously, and where to make changes in the Quinian network of beliefs. The
language games and conventions in which one participates precede individual speech and determine what can and cannot be said. In short, language and the search for knowledge are communal achievements. So
escape from either of the modem epistemological or linguistic axes calls
for a corresponding detachment from the individualist axis as well.

4
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panded category of "women" nor an internally multiplicitous self
97
that offers its complexity at once.
The postmodern critique of "the self," here expressed as a critique of gender identity, confirms the claim that ontology-what
something is-is not a given but a construct. In the case of
"woman," "[o]ne is not born, rather one becomes, a woman." 9 8
This point does not go far enough, as Butler's analysis of the discourse of "woman" demonstrates; for in every ongoing discursive
practice involving the category "woman," that category is open to
intervention and resignification. 9 9 The need to go further, then,
leads us at last to consider the roles of sex and gender, and their
constitution in law.
The effort to locate a sexed nature before the law seems to be
rooted understandably in the more fundamental project to be able
to think that the patriarchal law is not universally true and alldetermining. Indeed, if constructed gender is all there is, then
there appears to be no "outside," no epistemic anchor in a precultural "before" that might serve as an alternative epistemic point
of departure for a critical assessment of existing gender relations.
Locating the mechanism whereby sex is transformed into gender
is meant to establish not only the constructedness of gender, its
unnatural and nonnecessary status, but the cultural universality of
oppression in nonbiologic terms.
Only when the mechanism of gender construction implies the
contingency of that construction does "constructedness" per se
prove useful to the political project to enlarge the scope of possible gender configurations. If, however, it is a life of the body beyond the law or a recovery of the body before the law which then
emerges as the normative goal of feminist theory, such a norm
effectively takes the focus of feminist theory away from the con00
crete terms of contemporary cultural struggle.
Butler here defines the postmodern project of feminism as
nothing less than the subversion, at every turn, of modernist projections of "woman." The target of Butler's postmodern reconstruction of the relationship between gender and sex is the elevation of
that relationship into a juridical category that takes the sexed body
as gendered prior to its emergence from the order of discourse.
Only after a break in this univocal link will the postmodern reconstruction of identity begin to be thought. Only through discourse
will we know "woman": the unitary quality and character of
97
98
99
100

BUTLER, supra note 95, at 15-16.
SIMONE DE BEAUVOR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley trans., 1953).
BUTLER, supra note 95, at 33.
Id. at 38.
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"'woman" will be deconstructed away. As Julia Kristeva puts it,
10 1
"Strictly speaking 'woman' cannot be said to exist.
II
THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF LAW

We "began by asking, "What is at stake for feminist jurisprudence in the debate over postmodernism?" That debate implicates
one question that stands above all others: the question of critique.
If the modernist project of truth, right representation, legitimation,
correspondence, and critique is abandoned, will feminist jurisprudence be left with tools adequate for the task of criticism and transformation? As we have seen, the modernist argues that validity and
rational critique are not possible without philosophy.10 2 On that
view, then, feminism is not possible without philosophy. It is pre-

cisely this issue that divides contemporary feminist jurisprudence.
This Part considers the work of three contemporary feminist
critics of the law.103 Each scholar maintains a distinct perspective
on the question of critique. One embraces the project of modernity.
The second criticizes that project, but remains ambivalent about the
postmodern option. The third embraces a thoroughly postmodern
account of understanding and demonstrates the power of discourse
to shape our understanding of the social world. Together, these
critics illustrate the need for the current debate over the feminist
critique of law to come to terms with the postmodern critique of
reason.
101

ML at 1 (quotingJulia Kristeva). This claim is not as radical as it may first appear.

Kristeva sees different kinds of feminism as embodying different attitudes
to the symbolic. Liberal, equal-rights feminism demands for women an
equal rather than a marginal place in the symbolic. Radical feminism extols the distinctively feminine, which means it rejects the value placed on
the symbolic altogether. A further stage, which Kristeva speaks of as the
"third generation," would reject the very opposition of male and female
as metaphysical, and attack the whole notion of sexual, or even general,
identity.
DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM & LINGUISTIC THEORY 127 (1985).
102
See supra text accompanying notes 38-67.
103 For a number of reasons, I have chosen to focus on individuals rather than
themes. While it is true that everyone works within a more or less well-defined tradition
or orientation in thought, a position's importance depends on the arguments made in its
support. Arguments are developed in specific texts in support of specific points. It is
useless to say that a given position makes certain assumptions that turn out to be false
and then, on that basis, to impeach the position. Such "criticism" is often dismissed as
superficial (I am reminded of the reception given Roberto Unger's critique of liberalism
in ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975)).
I also believe that all three of the feminist authors I critique advance arguments
found in the work of others. In other words, the positions which I focus on are in no way
out of the mainstream. They represent main currents of thought in feminist
jurisprudence.
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Robin West

The feminist struggle with law is a struggle over the categories
used to organize legal experience and, thus, legal reality. Robin
West extends the critique of legal categories to a critique of the jurisprudence of legal categorization. In Jurisprudence and Gender,'14
Professor West advocates a jurisprudence that avoids reduplicating
the patriarchal categories of contemporary legalisms. Hers is "a
truly feminist jurisprudence .... define[d] as a jurisprudence built
upon feminist insights into women's true nature, rather than upon
masculine insights into 'human' nature."' 10 5 Startling as it may
seem, West denies that women are "human beings."' 1 6 This "philosophical fact," as she terms it, is the crux of her dispute with contemporary patriarchal jurisprudence.
We begin by reviewing Professor West's critique of patriarchal
jurisprudence, and then turn to her alternative schema. The question to which our attention will ultimately be directed is, "Where
does West's position fit on the divide between modem and
postmodern?" Is hers a postmodern critique of patriarchal jurisprudence, or does her critique of patriarchy and development of a theoretical alternative simply assume the truth of the modernist
conception of reason, thereby substituting one set of problems
(modernity) for another (patriarchy)?
Is critical legal theory so different from the liberal legal theory
it criticizes? Is the left-wing male "more sensitive to the political
underpinnings of purportedly neutral legalistic constructs" than is a
liberal legalist? 10 7 Professor West thinks not. In fact, she sees the
struggle between the left and the right as a sort of schoolyard
brawl-boys being boys. The differences between radical and mainstream politics are largely illusory, for they both represent "the
paradigmatically male experience of the inevitability of separation of
the self from the rest of the ...natural world."' 0 8 Both versions of
experience are true, but each presents a different side of the same
experience. Liberal legalists describe the life of the self as one of freedom and autonomy, a life of choices and assertion of individual personality.' 0 9 The experience of the left is one of alienation and
104
105
106

Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4 ("Women, though, are not human beings.").

107

Id.

Id. at 5.
109 The basic architecture of liberal thought was developed by Kant. See supra note
54. For the contemporary expression of this spirit in political theory, seeJOHN RAwLs, A
THEORY OFJUsTICE (1971). For the legal component of liberal legalism, see ErnestJ.
Weinrib, Legal Formality, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988); Ernestj. Weinrib, Law As a Kantian Idea
108

of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 472 (1987).
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isolation from the Other.' 10 The promise of liberation, so dear to
the cheerleaders for democracy, rings hollow for critical theorists.
Theirs is a perspective of despair and subjugation; they are crushed
under the weight of legal categories.
But why are these two disparate views in fact views of the same
thing, the same experience? The answer is that, unlike men, women
are connected. Feminists disagree about exactly what this "connectedness" amounts to, or how best to characterize it. There are two
principal views on the question. The first is cultural feminism,
which emphasizes women's sense of "existential 'connection' to
other human life,""' a connection not felt by men. This sense of
connection is elevated into a Weltanschauung described as the "feminine perspective." Suzanna Sherry explains the perspective in the
following passage:
[The feminine perspective views individuals primarily as interconnected members of a community. Nancy Chodorow and Carol
Gilligan, in groundbreaking studies on the development of self
and morality, have concluded that women tend to have a more
intersubjective sense of self than men and that the feminine perspective is therefore more other-directed .... The essential difference
between the male andfemale perspectives [is that]... "the basicfeminine
sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is
separate." Women thus tend to see others as extensions of themselves rather
than as outsiders or competitors. 12
Why, Professor West asks, are men and women different in this
essential way?' 3 The cultural feminist explanation is that "women
are more nurturant, caring, loving and responsible to others than
are men." 1 4 These differences from men are not merely differences (or deficiencies, for that matter) but are strengths to be positively valued. Carol Gilligan has not only valorized these traits, but
has also elevated them to the level of an essential social constitution
for women-a veritable moral identity. West summarizes this
perspective:
[W]omen's potential for a material connection to life entails
(either directly, as I have argued, or indirectly, through the reproduction of mothering) an experiential and psychological sense of
connection with other human life, which in turn entails both women's concept of value, and women's concept of harm. Women's
concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy, indiWest, supra note 104, at 9-10.
111 ld. at 15.
112 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 584-85 (1986)).
113
West, supra note 104, at 16.
110

114

Id. at 17.

282

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:254

viduality, justice and rights, as does men's, but instead around the
axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility and care.
For women, the creation of value, and the living of a good life,
therefore depend upon relational, contextual, nurturant and affective responses to the needs of those who are dependent and weak,
while for men the creation of value, and the living of the good life,
depend upon the ability to respect the rights of independent coequals, and the deductive, cognitive ability to infer from those
rights rules for safe living. Women's concept of harm revolves not
around a fear of annihilation by the other but around a fear of
separation and isolation from the human community on which she
depends, and which is dependent upon her. If, as I have suggested, cultural feminism is our dominant feminist dogma, then
this account of the nature of women's lives constitutes the "official
text" of feminism, just as liberal legalism constitutes the official
text of legalism.' 15
Alternatively, radical feminism takes a very different stance on
the question of difference. Unlike the "official" story of cultural
feminism, the radical account describes the essence of "woman" as
invasion and torment. Radical feminism views women's connection
to others-precisely that which is celebrated by cultural feministsas "the source of women's debasement, powerlessness, subjugation,
and misery."' " 16 On this view, these debasing connections are the
product of women's material constitution (e.g., its aspects of reproduction' 17 and intercourse' 18). West glosses these constitutive conditions this way:
The material, sporadic violation of a woman's body occasioned by
pregnancy and intercourse implies an existential and pervasive violation of her privacy, integrity and life projects. According to
radical feminists, women's longings for individuation, physical
privacy, and independence go well beyond the desire to avoid the
dangers of rape or unwanted pregnancy. Women also long for liberation from the oppression of intimacy (and its attendant values)
which both cultural feminism and most women officially, and
wrongly, overvalue. Intimacy, in short, is intrusive, even when it
isn't life threatening (perhaps especially when it isn't life threatening). An unwanted pregnancy is disastrous, but even a wanted
pregnancy and motherhood are intrusive. The child intrudes,just
as the fetus invades.
Similarly, while unwanted heterosexual intercourse is disastrous, even wanted heterosexual intercourse is intrusive. The penis occupies the body and "divides the woman" internally, to use
115
116
117
118

Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 32-35.
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Andrea Dworkin's language, in consensual intercourse no less
than in rape. It preempts, challenges, negates, and renders impossible the maintenance of physical integrity and the formation of a
unified self. The deepest unofficial story of radical feminism may
be that intimacy-the official value of cultural feminism-is itself
oppressive. Women secretly, unofficially, and surreptitiously long
for the very individuation that cultural feminism insists women
fear: the freedom, the independence, the individuality, the sense
of wholeness, the confidence, the self-esteem, and the security of
identity which can only come from a life, a history, a path, a voice,
a sexuality, a womb, and a body of one's own. 1 19

Just as there is an "official" and an "unofficial" story in legal
theory, so too in feminist theory. West captures the contrasts in the
following chart:
THE OFFICIAL STORY
(Liberal legalism and

THE UNOFFICIAL STORY
(Critical legalism

cultural feminism)

and radical feminism)

Value

Harm

Longing

Dread

LEGAL THEORY
(human beings)

Autonomy

Annihilation;
Frustration

Attachment;
Connection

Alienation

FEMINIST THEORY

Intimacy

Separation

Individuation

Invasion;

(women)

Intrusion
FIGURE 2

One might think that the unofficial stories in legal theory and
feminism bear some relation to each other, but Professor West dismisses this suggestion as "the widespread and confused claim that
critical legal studies already is feminist because the critical scholars'
description of subjectivity converges with the cultural feminists' description of subjectivity, and the less widespread but equally confused claim that radical feminism is 'just' liberalism, for the parallel
reason."' 12 1 The reason such a view of the relationship between
feminism and critical theory cannot be anything other than confused
is that the very comparison presupposes that women's and men's
subjectivities are somehow comparable. Professor West is eager to
deny precisely this assumption.
The male Critical Legal theorist values love and intimacy for
their liberating effect: they "hel[p us] overcome the distinction be119

120
121

dat35.

Id at 37.
Id at 38-39.
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tween self and nature."1 22 Women, however, do not want to overcome the distinction between self and nature: "women value love
and intimacy because they express the unity of self and nature
within [their] own selves." 123 Because "love, for men, is an acquired skill," 124 men will naturally think that alienation is something
to be overcome. For men, "separation (and therefore autonomy) is
what comes naturally. The separation that endangers women, by
contrast, is what is socially constructed-attachment is natural.
Separation, and the dread of it, is the response to the natural (and
1 25
pleasant) state of connection."
We now see that Professor West grounds her seemingly radical
claim that women are not human beings12 6 in her belief that, by virtue of their faith in a gender-neutral human subjectivity, male legal
theorists have simply elevated their own preconceptions into a notion of subjectivity that fails to capture the true nature of women's
subjectivity. As West summarizes the matter:
These, then, are the differences between the "human beings" assumed by legal theory and women, as their lives are now being
articulated by feminist theory. The human being, according to
legal theory, values autonomy and fears annihilation, while at the
same time he subjectively dreads the alienation that his love of
autonomy inevitably entails. Women, according to feminist theory, value intimacy and fear separation, while at the same time
longing for the individuation which our fear of separation precludes, and dreading the invasion which our love of intimacy entails. The human being assumed or constituted by legal theory
1 27
precludes the woman described by feminism.
Women and women's experience are not represented in modern jurisprudence because women are not recognized by the law.
Not "until we have a legal doctrine that takes women's lives as seriously as it takes men's" 128 will there be any hope for a "genuinely
ungendered jurisprudence (a jurisprudence "unmodified" so to
speak)."' 29 What must we do to make a place for women in legal
discourse? How can women, and women's "distinctive existential
and material state of being,"1 3 0 be adequately reflected in and considered by legal discourse? Professor West has a distinctly modernist answer to this question.
122
123
124

UNGER, supra note 103, at 206.
West, supra note 104, at 40.
Id. at 41.
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Id.
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127
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Id. at4.
Id. at 42.
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Id.
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Id. at 61.

Id. at 60.
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At no point in Professor West's analysis of the legal subordination of "women" does she view the concept of "woman" as anything
other than a single, unitary construct. In the opening paragraphs of
her essay, she states that women have a "true nature."1 3 1 Here she
makes her key modernist assumption: there is a "true nature" to
woman, which can then be represented or pictured in languagespecifically, in the language of legal discourse. Because their essence is at present not represented in language, women are excluded from this discourse; hence, they cannot be part of the
extension of the concept "human being."
Professor West also evinces distinct modernist sensibilities in
considering the question of truth. She maintains that to solve the
problem of women's exclusion from legal discourse, we must tell
"true stories" of women's lives.' 32 West suggests a sort of public
relations campaign: "We need to flood the market with our own
stories until we get one simple point across: wen's narrative story
and phenomenological description of law is not women's story and
phenomenology of law."' 3 3 She believes that turning around legal
discourse and forcing it to take account of the perspective of
"woman," calls for a rewriting of legal discourse "in direct language
that is true to our own [women's] experience and our own [women's] subjective lives."' 3 4 To use the language and expression of
modernism, the law must begin to mirror not only the male experience but the female experience as well. Notice, however, the nature
of the proposed solution to the problem of exclusion: just widen the
scope of the mirror. But what of "woman" or "women"? Where
does she (do they) reside? In legal discourse? Not according to
West. Yes, contemporary legal discourse includes something called
"woman," but that is not "true woman." And this is the point: for
West, "woman" exists as a something quite apart from what legal discourse makes her. In other words, "woman" exists prior to and
apart from her treatment in legal discourse. On West's account,
woman, whether gendered or sexed, exists prior to being taken up
and constituted by legal discourse. This must be true, for were it
not, then the idea of woman as a "unity of self and nature"' 35 ex36
isting outside legal discourse would be unintelligible.'
Id. at 4. See also Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 140-41 (1987) (strongly
emphasizing the need to ground an account of female identity in biology).
132
West, supra note 104, at 64.
133
Id. at 65.
134
Id at 70.
135 Id. at 40.
136 And intelligibility is the name of the game. See John H. Schlegel, The Ten Thousand DollarQuestion, 41 STAN. L.'REv. 435, 453 (1989) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)) ("But so long as intelligibility is the name of the
131
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In examining the gendered nature of modem legal discourse,
Professor West accepts without reservation the key modernist assumptions that underlie her critique. West claims there is a unitary
experience of women which has been systematically excluded from
legal discourse. In her view, altering the conditions for the possibility ofjurisprudential discourse is not the solution to the problem of
jurisprudence and gender-West does not advocate a new approach
to jurisprudence. Hers is a much less ambitious project, requiring
only that the net be widened to include "women." But can feminist
jurisprudence prescind from an uninterrogated modernism?1 3 7 We
now turn our attention to a feminist who has specifically addressed
this problem.
B. Joan Williams
1. Epistemology
In 1987,Joan Williams published CriticalLegal Studies: The Death
of Transcendenceand the Rise of the New Langdells.1 38 Professor Williams
argued that, in attempting to supplant the liberal account of legal
rationality, members of the Critical Legal Studies school ("CLS")
had duplicated some central conceptual errors of the modernist
program they were so eager to displace. What was their mistake? In
short, the CLS scholars failed to hear the message of the new epistemology. What role does this failure play in the Critical critique of
law, and what is this new epistemology? We turn first to the former
question.
The attributes of that all-too-familiar cardboard character, "the
liberal legalist," are well-known. She stands for the rule of law, the
principles of neutrality and fairness, the even-handed and objective
application of rules, and the virtues of consistency and publicity.13 9
Critical Legal scholars argue that this liberal message is a lie. In
game, epistemology, linguistics, and literary theory suggest that rendering the hermeneutic circle, understanding fully the culture of other thinkers' doing and thinking, is the
key to understanding an intellectual text."). For an important discussion of the role of
intelligibility in the narrative reconstruction of science, see Joseph Rouse, The Narrative
of Science, 33 INQUIRY 179 (1990). For a discussion of narrative as a form of explanation,
see Paul Roth, How Narratives Explain, 56 Soc. REs. 449 (1989).
137
West's unswerving commitment to modernism extends beyond gender to
method. In her review of Barbara Herrnstein Smith's book, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRrrICAL THEORY (1988), West rejects what she per-

ceives as Herrnstein Smith's relativism because that relativism contributes to domination and oppression. See Robin West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473
(1990).
138 Joan Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence & The Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
139
For a profound and moving account of liberalism in all its dimensions, see UNGER, supra note 103 (particularly chapters two and three).
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their view, the law is fraught with contradiction and bias. It cannot,
even on its best day, approach anything like "neutral application of
rules." Liberal legalism is far from being able to articulate a coherent account of the subject capable of free will and the pursuit of an
individual conception of the good, and the liberal individual is at
best a fiction.
According to Professor Williams, not only does the CLS critique of liberal legalism fail, but it also fails for the same reason as
liberalism. Duncan Kennedy's claim that embedded within liberal
legalism is "a fundamental contradiction" between individual and
community illustrates this failure. 40 Kennedy's claim implicates the
old story of the self and the other: attaining individual freedom simultaneously requires and is threatened by other people. Kennedy
makes his point this way:
[A]t the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of
others ... threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms
of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A friend can
reduce me to misery with a single look. Numberless conformities,
large and small abandonments of self to others, are the price of
41
what freedom we experience in society.'
What could be wrong with this assessment? Professor Williams
finds Kennedy's analysis problematic in that it posits an abstract
structure underlying the entirety of social experience: a structure
which purports to explain the multifarious social and political phenomena that are the everyday fare of life in civil liberal society.
Worse yet, Kennedy's analysis of liberal legalism's discourse
harbors "claims of privileged access to objective truth."' 4 2 What
was originally liberalism's problem-the unjustified claim of access
to objective truth-now surfaces in the metaphysics of Critical Legal
theory. How did this happen? Professor Williams has a complex
but familiar answer.
The members of CLS and their critics have failed to give due
attention to what Professor Williams refers to as "the new epistemology."1 4 3 New epistemology replaces the liberal-CLS metaphys140

(1979).

Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstones Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205

Id. at 211-12.
Williams, supra note 138, 474-75.
In Deconstructing Gender, Professor Williams summarizes the new epistemology
this way:
This critique, which I have elsewhere called the new epistemology, consists of a broad and diverse intellectual movement that rejects a range of
long-standing Western verities, some dating to the Enlightenment, and
others all the way back to Plato. Perhaps the core element of the new
epistemology is its rejection of an absolute truth accessible through rigorous, logical manipulation of abstractions.
141
142
143
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ics of structure, with its emphasis on the "Either/Or" of subjectiveobjective, self-other, determinate-indeterminate, with what we have
described earlier as the first aspect of postmodernism-that is, linguistic holism. Like the liberal legalist, the Critical Legal critic remains "trapped in dreams of transcendence."' 44 Professor
Williams, following (early) Wittgenstein, labels the linguistic version
of transcendence "the picture theory." 14 5 We encountered the pic46
ture theory in our earlier discussion of language and modernism.
Language functions as a medium of representation in which a nonlinguistic edifice that exists outside of language is represented in language. 14 7 Truth, on this account, is the accurate representation of
thing and structure through the medium of language.
By postulating a structure underlying the verbal play of linguistic reality, the CLS critique of liberal legalism evinces "a fundamental failure to abandon the universe shaped by the picture theory."1 48
Thus, neither the liberal legal claim that law is determinate nor the
CLS claim that law is indeterminate-though both are theoretically
appealing-prove workable in practice. The reason is precisely the
same in each case: the picture of "knowledge" each presupposes is
essentialist. As mentioned earlier, 14 9 abandoning the idea of a fixed
structure to which law "corresponds" obliges one to avoid "claim[ing] to have discovered the canonical, essential structure of
thought."' 5 0 But, if we give up essentialism, representationalism,
and truth-as-correspondence, what are we left with?
Professor Williams's answer derives from the later work of
Wittgenstein. When we give up the language of determinacy and
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797, 805 (1989).
144
Williams, supra note 138, at 432.
145 Id. at 433.
146
See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
147
In short, necessity is a function not of the nature of things (Aristotle) nor of mind
(Kant) but of language. See Gordon E. Michalson, Theology, HistoricalKnowledge, and the
Contingency-Necessity Distinction, 14 J. PHIL. OF RELIGION 87, 92 (1983).
The intelligibility of language does not rely upon its gaining purchase on
a realm of static laws and immutable truths waiting to be discovered and
articulated, but depends instead on how well language serves us as we go
about making our way in the world. The correct response to the relativism that apparently results from this is not to worry about a missing stability anchored "in reality"; the correct response is simply that "there is
as much stability as there is." Consequently, as one commentator has
recently summarized the matter, "whereas once we thought with Aristotle, that necessity came from things, and later thought with Kant that it
came from the structure of our minds, we now know that it comes from
language."
Id. (citations omitted).
148
Williams, supra note 138, at 489.
149
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
150 James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 715 (1985).
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indeterminacy, we replace truth conditions with assertability conditions. In other words, within a practice, we swap talk of truth for
persuasion. When a dispute arises over the judicial application of a
rule, for example, the critique will issue not from outside the
bounds of language but from within the borders of practice. We
make our appeals against the background of "a given cultural context."'
The question whether there is certainty 5 2 in our legal
practices ofjustification can only be answered from within particular
cultural contexts, for it is only "[t]he context [that] determines what
is required."'' 5 We remain always within our "form of life." We
cannot break out of it. This is not a limitation, however, for to see it
as a limitation is to play into the very picture of knowledge from
which we seek to extricate ourselves.
2. Feminism
Where, then, does feminism fit into the picture of knowledge
just articulated? To sharpen the question, how can feminism view
itself as a liberating discourse if, as Williams urges, it abandons the
effort to transcend our current perspective and assume a distanciated position from which to criticize the current configuration
of gender relations and the law's constitution of the feminine subject? 54 That is, need the following worry be taken seriously?
[H]ow are we to draw any principled distinction between the rejection of Enlightenment rationalism and the rejection of legiti151
152

Williams, supra note 138, at 494.
The most far-reaching study of the concept of certainty in the thought of the

later Wittgenstein is

THOMAS MoRAwrz, WrIGENSTEIN AND KNOWLEDGE

(1978).

Williams, supra note 138, at 493.
The tradition of thought invoked by Professor Williams in her critique of CLS
suggests the following answer:
[S]emantic analysis can provide no original information about the world
or our knowledge of it. We can expect only an indirect reconstruction or
reflection of what our own empirical science and common understanding
already tell us, together with information about how this might be expressed within different systems of notation. Semantic analysis discovers
notational rather than theoretical options. Given the full corpus of ante153
154

cedently established truth as parameter, it seeks formal principles for
constructing the truth, or for correlating it (or parts of it) with other
truth. It seeks truths only about the forms and formal relations of true
sentences. It is constrained at its borders not by observation or experience but by antecedently perceived truth. Semantic interpretation is
shaped by the truth as seen from the vantage point of some accepted
theory of the natural world, rather than by the evidence that shapes such
a theory. The interpretational hypotheses of the interpreter or analyst
have extralinguistic significance only relative to the already accepted doctrine of a background theory, but they provide no independent basis even for
understanding that doctrine let alone believing it.
GEORGE D. ROMANOS, QUINE AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 184-85 (1983) (emphasis
added).
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mation as such? The concession is, after all, a very significant one;
for having been told that intellectual traditions incorporate a capacity for critical reflection, we might well suppose that the forces
of Enlightenment had captured the high ground in the current
argument. If discursive communities are capable of self-criticism
in principle, we might ask, then who is to dictate how far they shall
take it? Won't there always be room for more, so long as any intelligible criticism can be addressed to the moral or cognitive order under which we live? And what is this limitless commitment
to the dialectical revision of theory and practice, if not precisely
the Enlightenment commitment to haul up everything in life
155
before the tribunal of reason.
We have noted Professor Williams's rejection of this
"Either/Or" dichotomy, which suggests that one either accepts that
there is a tribunal of Reason in which claims to truth and falsity are
interrogated,1 56 or gives oneself over to the ill-defined and hopelessly vague contours of discursive practice. Having rejected that
dichotomy in The New Langdells, however, Professor Williams goes
on to consider the implications of this rejection in the specific context of feminism. In Deconstructing Gender,15 7 she puts the new epistemology 58 to work by attacking the Enlightenment's celebration of
"reason over emotion"' 159 while simultaneously questioning feminist treatments of gender differences. As this analysis will reveal,
Professor Williams is deeply ambivalent about the new epistemology's usefulness as a critical tool for the emancipation of women
from the gendered structure of legal relations. Her ambivalence
serves to confirm the claim that the modern-postmodern divide is a
singularly important point of emphasis for feminist critics of law, for
until the question of critique is settled, the status of feminism as a
liberatory enterprise will be uncertain. Professor Williams's basic
disagreement is with the "difference" feminism advocated by Carol
Gilligan and her followers. She maintains that Gilligan's description
' 60
of gender differences is "inaccurate and potentially destructive."'
Williams has two specific disagreements with Gilligan. First, she believes that "it is incorrect as a matter of intellectual history to claim,
as have Gilligan and others, that the twentieth century's shift to a
more contextualizing, antiformalist, and relativizing form of discourse constitutes a rejection of absolutist 'male' epistemology in
155
156

Lovibond, supra note 1, at 11-12.
The metaphors of the "Tribunal of Reason" and the "Interrogation of Claims to

Truth by Reason" figure prominently and powerfully in the first chapter of GILLIAN
ROSE, THE DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM: POST-STRuCTURALISM AND LAW (1984).

157
158
159
160

Williams, supra note 143, at 805.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 801.
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favor of 'women's voice.' "161 Second, Williams contends that Gilligan overlooks what is important in the critique of existing conceptions of gender. In her view, it is not enough to argue, as Gilligan
does, that there is "a feminine voice." 16 2 A feminist critique of
"possessive individualism" is necessary; 163 without such a critique,
Gilligan's relational discourse may be turned against women. These
objections are connected, and may be considered together.
There is a fairly diverse range of opinion among feminists who
believe that women have a distinct "voice." Nevertheless, there is
basic agreement among them that feminism's contribution to the restructuring of gender relations should take place at the level of what
1
Suzanne Lebsock refers to as "a more humane social order." 6
Williams describes this focus the following way:
For all these feminists, this "more humane social order" entails a
new ethic of care based on a focus on relationships, not competition; on negotiation, not combat; on community, not individual
self-interest. "What is needed," concludes the early and influential feminist of difference Elizabeth Wolgast, "is another
model.... We need a model that acknowledges ... other kinds
of interest than self-interest." A more recent legal feminist
echoes this thought, noting his aspiration "to transform our polity
and its underlying assumptions from the alienated world of atomistic competition to an interconnected world of mutual
cooperation."

165

There is, however, a downside to this social order. If we view
men and women as truly different, then perhaps the two groups
ought to receive different treatment. 166 As a strategy, such an approach can backfire, as it did in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 16 7 To
161
162

Id at 800.

164

SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A

Professor Williams actually believes that Gilligan is ambivalent on this point. See
Williams, supra note 143, at 813. ("Gilligan's inconsistent signals about whether she is
talking about women or 'the feminine' have left relational feminism with the potential to
be used as a weapon against women.").
163
Professor Williams describes possessive individualism in this way:
The term refers to the liberal premises that society consists of market
relations, and that freedom means freedom from any relations with
others except those relations the individual enters voluntarily with a view
to his own self-interest.
Id at 810 n.40.
SOUTHERN TOWN, 1784-1860 (1984).
165
Williams, supra note 143, at 811

(citations omitted).
This is Elizabeth Wolgast's position: that equality and equal treatment need to
take account of "real differences." See ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 88 (1980) ("[W]omen should have some rights not applicable to
men.").
167
628 F.2d 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the expert testimony in the case, see Alice Kessler-Harris, History On Tial, 35
166
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rebut the charge that the company had discriminated against women
in filling its more lucrative commission sales positions, Sears's lawyers successfully argued that the absence of women from those positions was bound up with the nature of women. The lawyers argued
that because women focus on family, relationships, care and mothering, they often will forsake high-paying but time-intensive positions in favor of other positions that do not compromise their
(family) values.' 68 As Professor Williams characterizes the Court's
judgment, "Women's 'ethic of care' enables them to rise above the
fray, so they are not truly hurt when they are excluded from highpowered, competitivejobs in commission sales." 169 Yes, women are
different. They require different treatment-but they also make different choices. Women are more "focused on relationships, and
averse to capitalist virtues such as competition."'170 Sears did not
discriminate; rather, the women freely chose the ethic of care over
big bucks.
The relational feminists' critique of gender differences does not
take account of the particular economic choices facing both women
and men. It is precisely this failure-the failure to offer an economic
account of gender relations-that renders the relational account of
gender differences a feeble approximation of their reality. It is not
gender differences but "the gendered structure of American capitalism' 7 1 that is the source of women's (and men's) oppression. Women do not choose family responsibilities over the fast track.
"Women.know that if they do not sacrifice no one will, whereas men
assume that if they do not, women will."' 17 2 Women do not have the
same choices as men. Williams goes on to note that
[tihe underlying point is a deeper one: that society is structured so
that everyone, regardless of sex, is limited to two unacceptable
choices-men's traditional life patterns or economic marginality.
Under the current structure of wage labor, people are limited to
being ideal workers, which leaves them with inadequate time to
devote to parenting, and being primary parents condemned to
relative poverty (if they are single parents) or economic vulneraRADICAL HIsT. REV. 57 (1986); Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom
and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1988); Alice
Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and Levinson,
67 TEX. L. REV. 429 (1988); Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, On Academic Freedom
and Hypothetical Pools: A Reply to Alice Kessler-Harris, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (1989).
168
Sears, 628 F.2d at 320-21.
169
Williams, supra note 143, at 814.
170
Id. at 815. This .short summary of the case fails to do justice to Professor Williams's brilliant demonstration of the manner in which the lawyers for Sears simply
turned Gilligan's arguments against women.
171 Id. at 822.
172 Id. at 831.
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bility (if they are currently married to an ideal worker). Wage la7
bor does not have to be structured in this way.

So how did things get to be so bad? How is it that women, and
especially feminists like Carol Gilligan,' 74 have failed to see that not
only are they oppressed by the system of wage labor, but they are,
perhaps unwittingly, contributing to their own oppression? 75 Professor Williams's answer comes not from feminist theory but from
political theory, and, in particular, from the work of the Italian
Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci. According to Professor Wil76
liams, Gramsci's central notion, that of "cultural hegemony,"'
demonstrates that although they believe they are making choices, in
reality women
may be unwitting accomplices in the maintenance of existing inequalities. . . . Discovering nearly inexhaustible resources for
resistance to domination, many social historians have been reluctant to acknowledge the possibility that their subjects may have
been muddled by assimilation to the dominant culture - perhaps
even to the point of believing and behaving against their own best
1
interests. 77

The "language of domesticity" l7 8-that is, the notion that women speak "in a different voice" or are possessed of their own "ways
of knowing" 179-has to be, as Professor Williams puts it, de173

Id at 831-32.

1 am reluctant to buttress Professor Williams's inevitably logical critique of relational feminism with specific reference to the work of Carol Gilligan. Gilligan's research
deals with the psychic development of young children, not the socioeconomic parameters of late capitalist culture. While it is clear that her work is suggestive, there are limits
to its extrapolation.
175
See Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choice, 24 GA. L. REv. 761, 767-68
(1990) ("Like the women discussed by MacKinnon, Williams' subjects contribute to
their own subordination (this time, economic rather than sexual), with only limited understanding of the constraints on their choices and little sense of these choices as systematically self-destructive.").
176
Professor Williams discusses the notion thus:
Gramsci painted a complex picture of how the dominant culture rules
with the consent of the governed by shaping a "hegemony" of values,
norms, perceptions, and beliefs that "helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, discourages the clarification of social alternatives, and
makes it difficult for the dispossessed to locate the source of their unease,
let alone remedy it."
Williams, supra note 143, at 828-29.
177
TJ. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90
AM. HisT. REV. 567, 573 (1985).
178 Williams, supra note 143, at 828.
179
See MARY F. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
174

(1986). An excellent vehicle for raising the question of women's
way(s) of knowing is the Marlena Gorris 1984 Dutch film A QUESTION OF SILENCE. For a
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND

discussion of the film and its implications for this question, see Linda Williams, AJury of

Their Peers: Marlene Corris's A Question of Silence, in POSTMODERNISM
TENTS

107-15 (E. Ann Kaplan ed., 1988).

AND ITS DISCON-

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:254

coded.180 Why is it that women fail to see that they are the victims
of the dominant culture? Like Gramsci's proletariat,"s" can it be
that women suffer from false consciousness? 8 2 Women do not
make choices, for they are merely cogs in the capitalist wheel of
commerce. Their mission is to keep home and hearth intact while
the man stakes the family claim in the world of work. Women are
not making "choices," for they have no choices to make. They are
simply filling a role in the wage labor system.
This analysis is a powerful critique of both the wage labor system and the blindness inherent in relational feminism. But is this a
critique Professor Williams, as a proponent of "the new epistemology," gets to make? I propose that, on her own terms, the answer to
this question must be negative.' 8 3 The new epistemology rejects
the modernist dogma that knowledge can transcend the limits of
language, and maintains that claims to truth and "right representation" must be given up in favor of assertion and persuasion within a
discursive framework. The first casualty of the move to the new
epistemology was the neutral grid of objectivity,' 8 4 which was replaced by "the web of human agreements" as the foundation for
cognition. 8 5 However, by invoking Gramsci's critical posture of
cultural hegemony and resorting to words like "decode," "hegemony," and the like, Professor Williams places herself squarely within
180
181

Williams, supra note 143, at 828.
See SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin

Hoare & Geoffrey N. Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
182 Professor Williams scrupulously avoids using this phrase; however, her invocation of Gramsci's name, as well as her use of cognate terms, commits her to the view that
women, like the proletariat, suffer from this ideological disease.
183

See SUSAN

J.

HEKMAN, HERMENEUTICS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 150

(1986).
[Consider] the Marxist concept of false consciousness. A Marxist social
scientist, imposing the Marxist framework of interpretation on a sequence of action might be led to the conclusion that a particular group of
social actors [e.g., women] in a particular situation exhibit false consciousness. Again, the Gadamerian would have no difficulty with such a
conclusion. The 'text' of the action fused with the interpreter's Marxist
horizon yields a particular, yet perfectly legitimate interpretation. It
might even be argued that, given the influence of Marxist categories in
the social sciences, it is difficult for contemporary interpreters to see past
actions in anything but Marxist terms. That interpretive social science
and especially the Wittgensteinian school has had a great deal of difficulty
with the concept of false consciousness is, however, evident in the contemporary literature on this subject.

Id.
184 Professor Williams has elsewhere indicated her reservations about giving up on
truth. See Joan Williams, Feminism and Post-Structuralism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1776, 1778
(1990) (book review) ("Once we as feminists reject Truth, and are left only with arguments in favor of our interpretations, we are brought face to face with the need to persuade others to see the world as we do.").
185 Williams, supra note 138, at 453.
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the framework of objectivity, truth, and knowledge which she so successfully deconstructed in The New Langdels. Considered together,
The New Langdells and Deconstructing Gender demonstrate the importance of the problem of critique to a postmodernist critic of the law.
The contradiction inherent in Williams's work, however, need not
be a terminus, for in her critique of the relational feminists, she
demonstrates the precise point at which the new epistemology
breaks down. Thus, it would be foolish to view her failure to escape
the bounds of modernist rhetoric as a sign of an inherent or unavoidable limit to postmodernist criticism. Indeed, a third feminist
critic suggests a method for resolving that very contradiction.
C.

Zillah Eisenstein

Postmodernism's singular contribution to feminism has been to
raise the stakes in the sameness-difference debate. While feminists
of the "different voice" stripe were consolidating their position and
taking a respite from the arduous task of staking out a defensible
theoretical position on the question of gender identity, arguments
such as the following were being made:
There can be no guarantee of the nature of women's experience
since, in so far as it is meaningful, this experience is discursively
produced by the constitution of women as subjects within historically and socially specific discourses.... [W]omen's subjectivity
will always be open to the plurality of meaning and the possibilities contained within this plurality will have different political
implications. 186
Zillah Eisenstein introduces The Female Body and the Law 187 with
this provocative remark: "There is no one body, only bodies, only
differences, as well as pluralized conceptions of equality." 18 8 Eisenstein's target is the familiar reductionism of phallocentric liberal discourse-the notion that women are the same as men (equal) except
when the equality of women is being denied. In those instances, the
argument goes, the cause of the inequality is women's "differences"-their natural biological constitution. Gender and sex (biology) are simultaneously irrelevant (to equality) and determinative
(of inequality). For Eisenstein, the problem is not with the question
of the "truth" of biological differences; rather, it lies in how those
differences are discursively constructed. Thus, her inquiry is directed to the relationship between gender and power.
Let us begin with method. From the start, Eisenstein rejects the
very terms that make traditional epistemology possible. She states
186
187

CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE & PosTsTRucTuRALsT THEORY
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988).

188

Id.at 5.

167 (1987).
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that "the dualism of the real and the ideal is overdrawn."' 8 9 The
realms of fact and idea, material and immaterial, and idea and essence must be replaced not with new dualisms, but with an entirely
different way of thinking about the problems of meaning and understanding. To accomplish this, Eisenstein focuses on the concept of
"discourse."' 190 In this context, the point of the enterprise is not to
look at the object (e.g., woman) and how it is represented in language (e.g., representations of "woman."). Rather, it is to look at
how discourse-a "realm of thinking and acting"191producs
images of gender and sex.
So what does discourse have to do with the distinction between
modernism and postmodernism? As we have seen, the project of
right representation is the modernist project of knowledge. We
have also seen that it is a belief in the power of truth that underwrites the project of modernist epistemology. Eisenstein's "discourse" approach rejects the project of modernist epistemology as
not wrong but impossible. She junks categories like "ideology,"
which depend for their very existence on the dichotomous verities
of truth-ideology, real-unreal, clear-distorted, as worn out and useless. Does not this view, then, lead to relativism?1 9 2 Eisenstein addresses this problem the following way:

189

Id at 7. Eisenstein has drawn criticism from proponents of essentialism. See, e.g.,

Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1123,
1138 (1990) (reviewing EISENSTEIN, supra note 187).

[H]ad Eisenstein engaged with comparative anthropological theory in the
way that, for example, French feminist Julie Kristeva has done, she would
have confronted the deep and apparently universal unconscious operations that may motivate constructions of gender. Kristeva has noted an
apparent linkage between the universal tendency toward "abjection"the naming of particular persons and practices as absolutely other-and a
designation of certain processes of female bodies, such as birthing and
menstruation, as polluted.
Id. (footnote omitted).
190 See EtSENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 10-12.
19'
Id. at 11.
192

As Alan Hunt formulates the matter, the problem is one of paradox. See Alan

Hunt, The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism, 35 McGiLL L.J. 507, 538-39 (1990).

Postmodernism is also characterized by a general espousal of the tradition of discourse analysis and the general emphasis on the role of language in the construction of social reality. This involves adherence to the
epistemological view, which is central to Foucault's position, that there
are no objects of knowledge constituted outside discourse. This gives
rise to a profound paradox in postmodernist thought. If everything is

constituted in discourse, how can an alternative politics exist or any criticism take purchase which appeals to other meanings or knowledges?
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It is only within a standpoint that privileges objectivity and abso-

lutes that relativism and pluralism present a problem. Plurality
does not mean that all truths are equal; it merely uncovers the
role of power in defining truth. Once truth has been defined, we
are free to argue in behalf of our interpretation, but we cannot use
the claim to truth itself as our defense.... We must leave mean193
ings open at the same time we act on them.
If there is no place outside discourse, how can one establish its
meaning? Is the body completely a construction in discourse,
19 4
with no outside? Is the body sexed? Gendered? A mix?
We need to recognize that differences exist within and between
the sexes. There are a variety of kinds of female bodies: thin, fat,
small-breasted, large-breasted, muscular, flabby, and so forth.
These differences exist within other differences as well: sexual
preference, economic class, race, age, and so on. 19 5
One must appreciate Eisenstein's sensitivity to the charge that,
from the postmodernist perspective, all questions of difference are
simply a matter of one's own view. It would be unfair to level such a
charge at Eisenstein, because as the passages above demonstrate,
her concern is not to dispute that "[s]ex and gender differences exist." 19 6

Instead, she urges the claim that "their significance must
remain open-textured." 1 9 7 Here we come to the crux of the difference between the modem and postmodern approaches to the question(s) of feminism. If we give up the modernist view-embraced by
Robin West-that the significance of gender differences can be setfled by appeal to a totalizing structure that transcends discourse,
what are our alternatives? Joan Williams sees the new epistemology's answer as critique proceeding from within the bounds of existing culture. EEOC v. Sears, however, prompted a re-evaluation of
this strategy, and engendered a move back to modernist concepts
like "cultural hegemony" and the "decoding" of experience.' 9 Is
Eisenstein's a truly postmodern approach-one that avoids the traps
that caused Williams to fall back into the modernist framework?
193
194
195

196
197
198

EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 23-24.
Id at 29.
Ia at 31-32.
Id at 35.
Id.

This move is really just a shuffle, since Williams remains within a modernist
framework. What happened in EEOC v. Sears is a perfect example of what is wrong with
modernism; Sears's lawyers successfully sold "woman" as a universal category. Williams
simply replicates this form of argument by insisting that another universal categoryhegemony-is the true explanatory ground. The proper way to attack the logic of the
case is at the level of the form of the argument itself.
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We can assess the adequacy of Eisenstein's discourse-oriented1 9 9 approach to law by analyzing her treatment of a specific
topic: pornography. Among the most bizarre.coalitions produced
by the politics of the eighties, none could be more curious than that
formed by the New Right and certain feminists on the issue of pornography. Seemingly, it was the shared purpose of eliminating
pornography's subordination and oppression of women that engendered this unusual coalition. Eisenstein argues, however, that this is
an erroneous description of what was at stake in the debate over
pornography in the eighties. 20 0 In fact, her analysis of the pornography debate suggests that by joining in the New Right's wholesale
rejection of pornography, some feminists actually contributed to the
continuing oppression of women.
Eisenstein notes that "[p]ornography is very much tied to the
meaning of engendered sex: in it females are displayed as subjugated, objectified women." 20 ' But her argument is grounded in her
claim that pornography is not just "one thing." Pornography has
many meanings, including, but not limited to, "fantasy and rebellion." 20 2 These multiple meanings "coexist within pornography,
and they crisscross the realms of the real and ideal." 20 3 Further,
"some females may feel pleasure in imagining both being subjugated and subjugating others. Because sexual pleasure can be experienced as a liberating feeling (liberation from inhibition),
fantasies of subjugation may be emancipatory. Thus, pornography
is not a homogenized discourse expressing only women's
2
oppression." °4
Is this also the New Right's reading of pornography? Hardly.
For the New Right, the female is mother, Madonna with child-she
needs protection (from pornographers), not emancipation. We
must free her from the pornographer's subjugation so that we may
enslave her to the role of wife and mother. 20 5 The New Right
chooses to address the evil of pornography on the level of its injurious effects on women. From this picture of pornography's impact
on women flows the notion that pornography is something from
199 Professor Eisenstein explicitly invokes Foucault's "discourse" analysis in support
of her view of legal knowledge. See EiSENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 10-12. For a discussion of Foucault's thought and postmodernism, see DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNrry 45 (1989).

200

Her specific focus is the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, which

issued its final report in 1986. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL
REPORT (1986).
201 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 163.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204

Id. at 163-64.

205

Id. at 164.
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which women need protection. Does this mean that, as Eisenstein
asks, to argue against pornography is to "challeng[e] women's status as victims"? 20 6 The New Right would have us believe that it
is. 2 0 7 Curiously, some feminists also take it to be the case.
The feminists Eisenstein has most in mind are Andrea Dworkin
and Catharine MacKinnon. In their well-publicized promotion of
antipornography statutes in Minneapolis and Indianapolis, 20 8 Dworkin and MacKinnon took the position that pornography is "a practice of sex discrimination, a violation of women's civil rights, the
opposite of sexual equality." 20 9 Nothing could be wrong with opposing sex discrimination. But the problem is not whether one is
for or against sex discrimination. Rather, the problem is the link
between pornography and sex discrimination; "seeing pornography" from the perspective of (sex) discrimination. The problem
concerns the clouding of motives and frames of reference. For the
New Right, a desire to protect women fuels the antipornography
campaign. Women are different from men, and need protection.
Feminists do not share this motivation. Their interest in eliminating
pornography is not in protecting women but in empowering
them. 2 10 Again, what could be wrong with this agenda?
First, the New Right and feminists share the view that
pornography is something men enjoy and women do not, that it is
something men do to women, that woman is the victim and man is
the aggressor. And both feminists and the right wing assume that
pornography is the same as violence, an assumption that makes it
difficult to avoid thinking about sex in other than protective
21
terms. 1
Now comes the rub. By campaigning against pornography across
the board; feminists in fact contribute to the subordination of
women. They do so because the pornography against which they
protest sends more than one message. It is true that some pornography contains messages of violence and oppression. However,
"[plornography carries many messages other than woman-hating: it
advocates sexual adventure, sex outside of marriage, sex for no reason other than pleasure, casual sex, anonymous sex, group sex,
Id at 165.
Eisenstein presents an interesting critique of the New Right's political agenda
and its relationship to the social-scientific conclusions of the Presidential Commission.
She focuses in particular on the dubious nature of the claimed causal connection(s) between certain forms of pornography and violence against women. See id at 168-70.
208 See, e.g., Indianapolis City-County General Ordinance No. 35, 1984, Proposal No.
298, 1984.
209 MAcKINNON, supra note 7, at 175.
210 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 171.
211 Id
206
207
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voyeuristic sex, illegal sex, public sex." 21 2 If this picture of the relationship between pornography and freedom is persuasive, then
Eisenstein's conclusion is inexorable: "If pornography is not universally victimizing, then a sweeping indictment of it can create a
new problem-denial of the freedom to engage in multiple sexual
21 3
practices."
What does this analysis have to do with postmodernism? 21 4 A
great deal. In fact, I believe that Eisenstein's critique of Dworkin
and MacKinnon shows how the failure to transcend modernist assumptions (in this instance, modernist assumptions about women,
sex, and subordination) 21 5 contributes to the further denial of wo212 Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Antipornography Feminist Legislation in the U.S., in
WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 145 (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985).
213 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 171.
214 For one thing, Eisenstein's critique upsets the easy alliance between idea and
image. It notes that the idea (of "woman" or "sexuality"), which is a function of image,
can be changed at the same moment it is understood. SeeJACQUJELINE ROSE, SEXUALTY
IN THE FIELD OF VISION 231 (1986).
Artists engaged in sexual representation (representation as sexual) come
in at precisely this point, calling up the sexual component of the image,
drawing out an emphasis that exists in potentia in the various instances
they inherit and of which they form a part. Their move is not therefore
one of (moral) corrective. They draw on the tendencies they also seek to
displace, and clearly belong, for example, within the context of that
postmoderism which demands that reference, in its problematised form,
re-enter the frame. But the emphasis on sexuality produces specific effects. First, it adds to the concept of cultural artefact or stereotype the
political imperative of feminism which holds the image accountable for
the reproduction of norms. Secondly, to this feminist demand for scrutiny of the image, it adds the idea of a sexuality which goes beyond the
issue of content to take in the parameters of visual form (notjust what we
see but how we see-visual space as more than the domain of simple recognition). The image therefore submits to the sexual reference, but only
in so far as reference itself is questioned by the work of the image.
Id.
215 For a more ideological slant on the question of pornography's relationship to
phallic images, which nonetheless affirms that current practices are the best place to
begin the rethinking of a gender relations, seeJoAN CocKs, THE OPPOSITIONAL IMAGINATION 148 (1989).
[W]e can remain on ideological territory but take a different flight of the
imagination than the one dictated to us. We can conjure up possibilities
for eroticism not when the phallus is subject and force, but "merely"
when the phallus is assigned by a hegemonic culture to the position of
subject and force. Given the veil of secrecy over the actual bedroom, this
is surely the more sympathetic course, and it is the one I mean to follow
here. It does require that we exchange an empirical method for one that is
partly literary. We cannot behave as if we were searching for facts when
we really are looking for plots that are persuasive and characters that ring
true. Yet neither are we free to fix on any erotic possibility that happens
to please us. Instead, we must confine our imaginations within narrow,
deductive bounds. We must look for plots and characters that are logically possible-given, first of all, the existence of a hegemonic culture of
Masculine/feminine; given, second, our rejection of the idea that such a
ulture is totalitarian in its wielding of control or that it has a one-to-one
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men's freedom. 2 16 I will begin with Dworkin and MacKinnon's position on the relationship between pornography and sexual
subordination. Dworkin states that if part of what angers women
is that we're [Dworkin and MacKinnon] suggesting that there are
things that are right and things that are wrong, and one of the
things that is wrong is the sexual subordination of women, that's
2 17
accurate. Politics is about making those kinds of distinctions.
As Eisenstein points out, "this view holds only if pornography treats
women exclusively as victims. 2 18 With this observation, we return
to postmodernism. Eisenstein's point is that there is no "truth" 21 9
to the female sexuality that is subordinated by the"pornographer.
To reduce "sex to its engendered form," 22 0 as MacKinnon does, "is
to let the phallus win. It is like saying that the female body is one
221
with the mother's body."
For MacKinnon, women's sexuality is not something that exists
apart from its representation in discourse. There is, as MacKinnon
puts it, "sexual reality." 22 2 That "reality" is the product of, and is
consistent with, the vision of male sexuality. What is at stake is not
the question of whether sexuality is real or unreal. Rather, what
matters is whether or not one buys into what Eisenstein refers to as
the "oppositional mode of thinking." 223 There is a physical aspect
to sex; call it "the real." 2 24 There are also ideas about "the real";
call these "the ideal."' 225 Dworkin and MacKinnon complain that
women are subordinated because men have reduced woman's sexuality to the male ideal. Here Eisenstein makes her postmodernist
point: there is no (one) such thing as "female sexuality." On the
contrary, there are many ways to think about female sexuality. Like
correspondence to actually lived and felt life; and given, third, our refusal
to presume at the start any essential significances to the male and female
bodies.
Id
216 The point is that by thinking about pornography in a totalizing, modernist form,
Dworkin and MacKinnon throw out too much. By failing to interrogate specific objects,
practices, or forms of depiction, they embrace a conception of pornography that sacrifices freedom on the mantel of totalization.
217
Andrea Dworkin, quoted in Mara Math, Andrea Dwbrkin Talks About Feminism and
Pornography, GAY COMMUNrrY NEWS, Dec. 28, 1985, at 8. MacKinnon echoes this view.
See MAcKINNON, supra note 7, at 148 ("[P]ornography institutionalizes the sexuality of
male supremacy ....
).
218
EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 172.
id at 223 ("Biology-as the body-is always mediated through its discourses.").
219
220
Id at 172.
221
Id.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 326-27
222
(1984).
223 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 172.
224
Eisenstein refers to this as "the actual picture." Id. at 173.
225
Eisenstein refers to these as "interpretation." Id.
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pornography, "it has a multiplicity of meanings. '2 26 "The antipornography position does not recognize this and therefore with
uncomplicated simplicity can reduce sex to its engendered form:
pornography is reduced to violence; sexual equality is reduced to a
'2 27
protectionist stance.
The crux of the matter is that the way to increase the freedom
of women is to free both sexes from the oppositional mode of modernist thinking. It is this mode that reduces sexual relations to a
series of binary oppositions, 228 enslaving political discourse to the
production of unities that have the appearance of being part of the
architecture of thought. For Eisenstein, it is a mistake to fight pornography by treating it "as a unity." 22 9 Like sex, pornography can
take a multitude of forms, some of which "have a positive effect in
depicting sex as not necessarily tied to pregnancy, marriage, or heterosexuality. Pornography can help to create a multiplicity of sexual
imagery that- enhances women's equality by differentiating the female body from the mother's body." 230 By reducing pornography's
multiplicity of meanings, antipornography feminists risk denying
women the very freedom they aspire to secure for them.
III
POSTMODERNISM/FEMINISM/LAW

A.

Generalization

Owing to the universalistic nature of the prose, modernist
forms of argumentation tend to suffer from the problem of "careless
generalization." 23 1 Postmodernism holds open the possibility of
breaking free from careless generalization, of renewing interest in
the manifold properties of particular cases. 2 32 It notes that by eschewing the particular historical circumstances within which our
conceptions of self and others are forged, we lose track of the path
226

Id.

227

Id.

228 For an insightful discussion of the entrenchment of oppositional thought, see
J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE LJ. 1669 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. ELLIS,
AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION

(1989)).

229 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 173.
230 Id.
231
Gary Wickham, The Political Possibilities of Postmodernism, 19 ECON. & SOC'Y 121,
122 (1990) (describing the inductive and deductive manifestations of "careless generalization"). Of course, postmodernist modes of expression are themselves hardly free of
this problem.
232
For a discussion of the return to particularism in ethics, see ALBERT R.JONSEN &
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988). The return to particulars in law
began with American Legal Realism. See Dennis M. Patterson, Law s Practice, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 575 (1990) (book review).

1992]

POSTMODERNISM

303

from which we have come to be what we are.23 3 We fail to see the
extent to which we are as much product as producer. In short, we
fail to appreciate culture
not as some subjective or idealized world view that is to be distinguished from behavior but as a form of behavior itself and as the
tangible results of that behavior .... The important point is that
culture... is explicitly produced rather than simply being23implic4
itly embedded in, or constitutive of, social arrangements.
As a postmodernist would frame it, the problem with careless
generalization is that it "not only ignores the specific voices ofparticular political sites, it effectively works to stop these speific voices being
heard."2 35 For example, the most egregious problem with Robin
West's critique of gender's place in modern jurisprudence is not the
lack of argument in support of the platitude "woman's 'true' nature," but the fact that she does nothing with it. In her critique of
the Official and Unofficial versions of legalism, for example, Professor West never questions the empty generalizations ("autonomy,"
"connection," "alienation") she seeks to criticize. Instead of showing why these context-independent categories have no explanatory
value, West substitutes equally empty notions (e.g., "intimacy,"
"separation," "invasion"). Despite her claim of telling the story of
"women's subjectivity," 23 6 Professor West never tells any stories.
Thus, her call for "direct language" 23 7 rings hollow-she makes no
effort to engage reality, being satisfied instead to dance across a universe of empty abstractions.
In her discussion of wage labor, Joan Williams demonstrates
the gains to be reaped from careful attention to context. However,
in her critique of the Sears decision, she mistakes the political downside of careless generalization for a substantive thesis about "wo233
A focus on historical circumstances does not foreclose critical analysis of tradition. See RICHARD SHUSTERMAN, T.S. ELIOT AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM 161
(1988).
[T]radition admits of immanent critique. Even the most unified tradition
will contain inner tensions or gaps which in the face of new circumstances
would yield conflicting responses or troubling indecision as to how to
behave. Such situations compel tradition to reflect critically on itself and
to adjust or redefine itself to resolve them, where competing reconstructive interpretations of tradition stimulate further critical reflection. To
suppose that tradition contains no possibility for internal conflict or different future projections is to conceive of it as a fully programmed and
uniformly closed system, rather than the roughly fashioned, open-structured scheme of divergent elements which we know it to be.
Id.
234
ROBERT WUTHNOW, COMMUNITIES OF DISCOURSE 15 (1989).
235
Wickham, supra note 231, at 132.
236 West, supra note 104, at 37.
237
Id at 70.
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men's nature." The reason Sears's attorneys were rhetorically
successful is not that they convinced the court of the truth of an
essentialist model of women; Sears's lawyers won because they were
able to create a reality through the careful use of a generality coupled
with a finite context. Williams makes this point herself (albeit unknowingly) when she notes that it is only within the framework of
the wage labor system that the essentialist argument about women's
true nature is successful. The critical counterfactual question is
never asked: What if the reality of women's need to work became
part of the context within which Sears's conduct was judged? Under
the terms of Williams's own argument, by which I am persuaded,
the relational feminists' conception of gender differences would not
have been outcome-determinative.
This is the point at which Williams's return to modernist forms
of explanation undercuts the power of her insight. Williams's argument regarding the structure of wage labor and its relationship to
our cultural conceptions of women is in no way undermined if the
veiled references to "false consciousness" are dropped. Professor
Williams appears unwilling to take the leap into postmodernism and
simply make her case on the merits of the facts as she constructs
them. But she can, and she should. Her argument trips over the
modernist props she would do well to jettison.
Is Professor Williams's worryjustified? Does postmodernism in
fact leave us without any critical standards? In untangling the pornography debate, Professor Eisenstein explicitly rejects the notion
that gender is a product of nature (sex). Yet notice that, despite the
seemingly radical nature of that rejection, her claim is not so radical
after all.23 8 The trick is to see that the argument works backwards:

pornography explains sex and, thus, gender. By examining the particulars of pornography, Eisenstein shows that the depiction of
women in corporeal form carries no inherent meaning. 23 9 Pornography is a (cultural-conceptual) manifestation of the physical form.
The (cultural) meaning of pornography can be singular, but need not
be. This is Eisenstein's argument against the Dworkin-MacKinnon
position on pornography. By reducing "sex to its engendered
form,"

240

Dworkin and MacKinnon have foisted upon women an es-

sentialist picture of subordination and, in the process, deprived women of a measure of freedom.
238 In fact, despite its references to postmodern forms of argument, Professor Eisenstein's argument succeeds not because it is "postmodern" but because it is persuasive.
239
Again, Eisenstein does not argue that there are no biological differences between
men and women. Rather, her argument is that the meaning of those differences is a matter of culture.
240 EISENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 172.
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Understanding and Narrative

If we agree with Judith Butler that "woman" is not a thing represented in language but is "an ongoing discursive practice... open
to intervention and resignification, ' ' 24 1 then we are inevitably
brought face to face with the question of critique. If the law does
not represent-accurately or inaccurately-some conception of
"woman," then what is the role of critique?24 2 From what perspective does critique issue? What is the object of critique? If there is no
viable perspective from which to assess the moral and political inadequacies of the law, then how is criticism possible?
Answers to these questions begin to emerge in a reconsideration of Quine's holistic epistemology. 24 3 If the truth or falsity of a
belief is a function of other beliefs, then one intent on changing
current understanding is best advised to begin with the network of
existing beliefs. 24 4 On this view, the dubitability or indubitability of
a belief is a function neither of the belief itself nor of some transcendent web of understanding. There are infinite measures of a besupra note 95, at 33.
Peggy Radin summarizes this worry nicely:
But how can the pragmatist find a standpoint from which to argue that a
system is coherent but bad, if pragmatism defines truth and good as coherence? Inattention to this problem is what makes pragmatism seem
complacent, when it does. One answer to the problem of bad coherence,
which the pragmatist will reject, is to bring back transcendence, natural
law, or abstract idealism. Another answer, which the pragmatist can accept, is to take the commitment to embodied perspective very seriously
indeed, and especially the commitment to the perspective of those who
directly experience domination and oppression.
MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710 (1990).
243
See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
244
A "network" is a set of conventions used by participants in a certain activity to
coordinate their shared endeavor. The following description of conventionalism in the
art world applies equally well to law.
People who cooperate to produce a work of art usually do not decide
things afresh. Instead, they rely on earlier agreements now become customary, agreements that have become part of the conventional way of
doing things in that art. Artistic conventions cover all the decisions that
must be made with respect to works produced, even though a particular
convention may be revised for a given work. Conventions dictate the
materials to be used . . .to convey particular ideas or experiences, as
when painters use the laws of perspective to convey the illusion of three
dimensions or photographers use black, white, and shades of gray to convey the interplay of light and mass. Conventions dictate the form in
which materials and abstractions will be combined, as in music's sonata
form or poetry's sonnet. Conventions suggest the appropriate dimensions of a work, the proper length of a performance, the proper size and
shape of a painting or sculpture. Conventions regulate the relations between artists and audience, specifying the rights and obligations of both.
HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS 29 (1982). Thus, the way to begin the process of
"rethinking" legal concepts is to question our conventions of understanding. For a further discussion of this point in the legal context, see Dennis M. Patterson, An Introduction
to Conventionalism, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43 (1988).
241
242

BUTI ER,
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lief.2 45 The lesson is this: the question, "Is this belief true?" must

be replaced with the question, "How is this belief to be understood
(and can it be understood differently) within this story?" 24 6
The reason postmodernism ultimately forces feminist jurisprudence to become narrational 24 7 is tied to the lack of cognitive authority248 for our practices. 2 49 In this regard, jurisprudence can take
a lesson from contemporary philosophy of science. In The Structure
245
This view is expressed by Quine's thesis of "underdetermination": any data can
be "explained" by a host of theories. See W.V. Quine, On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of
Translation, 67 J. PHIL. 179-83 (1970). For a discussion of this theory, see ROGER F.
GIBSON, JR., THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE 84-90 (1982).
246 On the importance of the storied character of legal understanding, see Robert
M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword- NOMOS and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 4-5 (1983).
247
As a reconstructive enterprise, narrative has close affinities to pragmatism. This
Article is not the place to detail the differences, but at least one must be mentioned.
American pragmatism emphasizes "communities of inquiry," the members of which
work toward "convergence" in their beliefs. These beliefs they take to be true. In a
narrative account of understanding, on the other hand, "truth" is at best a compliment
paid to ways of understanding that are intersubjective-talk of "truth" muddies the
water.
Despite these differences, I think it a mistake to say, as Richard Rorty does, that
"pragmatism is banal in its application to law." Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism
and the Poetry ofJustice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1811, 1811 (1990). To take an example from
my own field of commercial law, the number of converts to pseudo-scientific methodologies like rational choice theory and game theory is, if anything, on the rise. The dubious
philosophical pretensions of these pseudo-scientific methodologies must be shown for
what they are, and pragmatism seems well positioned to do that. Additionally, pragmatism is a sound posture for the critique of all forms ofjudicial pseudo-objectivism. See,
e.g., Dennis M. Patterson, A Fablefrom the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith,
76 IowA L. REv. 503 (1991) (critiquing judicial lapse into plain meaning, deductivism,
and other sins of the nineteenth century).
248 It is the lack of cognitive authority that underwrites the conventionalist belief
that understanding is not a matter of theory but is, as Wittgenstein says, "a way of acting." LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 204 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. Von
Wright eds., G.E.M. Anscombe & Denis Paul trans., 1972). It is important to keep in
mind that the idea of "knowledge" is not being rejected; rather, it is being reconstructed. The locus of knowledge is being transferred from the individual to the group.
249 See Mark Okrent, The Metaphilosophical Consequences of Pragmatism, in THE INsTrITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY: A DISCIPLINE IN CRISIS? 187 (Avner Cohen & Marcelo Dascal eds.,
1989).
Considered on its own grounds, pragmatism is a recommendation in regard to a way of speaking. It suggests that there is no point in searching
for the essence of truth, mind, language, etc., and thus no point to the
traditional philosophical game. Pragmatism is the application of the philosophical position of anti-essentialism to the objects of philosophical discourse themselves.
It is with respect to this last point-the application of antiessentialist positions to philosophical questions-that I think Richard Posner goes wrong when he describes the view
advanced in these pages as "back to basics." See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 424 (1990). The whole point of the enterprise is not "back" to anything;
rather, it is "away" from a set of methods and questions identified with traditional
philosophy.
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of Scientific Revolutions,2 50 Thomas Kuhn demonstrated that, contrary
to common philosophical and scientific understanding of the enterprise, "the authority of science has no basis beyond the consensus of
its practitioners, specifically, no basis in a privileged, truth-gaining
method."'2 5 ' One might object that the practice of science is objective because it provides the best explanation of events in the physical world. But what is "best" is simply "the explanation which best
suits the purpose of some given explainer." 252 There is no denying
that scientific models or "pictures" of reality serve heuristic purposes. 25 3 Again, however, it is the scientific community that judges
the adequacy of these models, according to its own methods and
purposes. Nothing validates one picture (or a picture about how to
choose a picture) over another. "In the end all you have is what we
all agree is self-evident or conceptually necessary or linguistically
2 54
required."
In this analysis lies a lesson about the relationship between
noncognitivism, narrative, 2 55 and critique. Like all emancipatory
250
251

KuHN, supra note 90.

Gary Gutting, Paradigmsand Hermeneutics: A Dialogueon Kuhn, Rorty, and the Social
Sciences, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 4 (1984).
252 Richard Rorty, Is Natural Science a Natural Kind?, in CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRAINT 69 (Ernan McMullin ed., 1988).
253 See REPRESENTATION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 5-6 (Michael Lynch & Steve Woolgar eds., 1990) (describing multiple uses of representation). See also HxLARY PuTNAM,
REPRESENTATION AND REALrrY 21-22 (1988).
[N]one of the methods of representation that we know about-speech,
writing, painting, carving in stone, etc.-has the magical property that
there cannot be different representations with the same meaning. None of
the methods of representation that we know about has the property that
the representations intrinsicallyrefer to whatever it is that they are used to
refer to. All of the representations we know have an association with
their referent which is contingent, and capable of changing as the culture
changes or as the world changes.
Id. For recent treatments of representation in the realm of disease, see DouGLAs CRIMP
& ADAM ROLSTON, AIDS/DEMO/GRAPHICS (1990); SANDER L. GILMAN, DISEASE AND
REPRESENTATION: IMAGES OF ILLNESS FROM MADNESS TO AIDS (1988); LUDWIK FLECK,
GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SCIENTIFIC FACT (Thaddeus J. Trenn & Robert K.
Merton eds., Fred Bradley & ThaddeusJ. Trenn trans., 1979); AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM OCTOBER 43 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1987); KENNETH J. CARPENTER, THE HISTORY OF SCURVY & VITAMIN C (1986).
254 Gutting, supra note 251, at 6. See generally LAUDAN, supra note 90 (reviewing contemporary approaches to the relationship between theory, evidence, and judgment).
255 For an argument that objectivity is a condition for the possibility of an objective
narrative, see TERRY F. GODLOVE, JR., RELIGION, INTERPRETATION, AND DIVERSITY OF BE-

149 (1989).
[B]y divorcing objectivity and narrative, we mask a deep connection between them. At the empirical level, objectivity is a notion upon which
religious (and other) narratives must rely, most obviously when they
claim to be true (about the world we have not made). But this same objectivity depends, in turn, upon a narrative function operative at the formal or transcendental level. At stake in the reflexive connection between
objectivity and narrative is the integrity of each notion: objectivity, be-
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discourses, feminism aspires to alter our current practices of understanding. 2 56 The inadequacy of modernist programs of reform suggests that the craving for a totalizing critique of gender relations is
an illusion from which we have been freed. 2 57 This freedom comes
at a price; more importantly, it reveals certain limitations bounding
feminist discourse. The most important of these limitations is the
recognition that criticism of existing practices must issue from
within those very practices. In other words, "going local" entails
holding in place the very practices of understanding being
25 8
challenged.
This conception of critique forces feminist jurisprudence into a
reflexive 25 9 examination of the very practices of understanding that
cause the activity of relating lies at its base; narrative, because, as [Hilary]
Putnam-and, as I read him, Kant before him-points out, unless we narrate about something, we cannot distinguish speech from noise.
Id.
256

The question is where to start-the answer, "From where we are." See DAvID

KOLB, POSTMODERN

SOPHISTICATIONS:

PHILOSOPHY, ARCHITECTURE AND TRADITION

(1990).
But where do we start? We start from where we are. We are always moving within and from current conventions, already on the move in projects
we did not choose, in languages we did not create. We do not have to
choose between architecture and revolution. It is always too late to start
from scratch; there is always language and meaning ahead and behind.
That is the condition the moderns tried to overcome, but the tabula cannot be razed, and the attempt to do so leaves what was to be denied present as resented.
But if we have no centered overview, if we are extending our languages and forms of life as we build, how do we know which moves to
make? Only some new combinations and moves suggest themselves. We
work in a disciplined way, judging what is appropriate, and neither the
discipline nor the judgment are universally rational..
Id. at 162-63.
257 But see Bell Hooks, Feminism: A Movement to End Sexist Oppression, in FEMINISM AND
EQUALrrY 62 (Anne Phillips'ed., 1987) (arguing that the success of feminism as an
emancipatory enterprise is tied to the advancement of a definition of "feminism").
258 This approach is antithetical to and skeptical of the modernist presupposition
that the needs of women can be identified apart from some discourse. See Bartlett, supra
note 5, at 887 ("I have argued that feminist methods are means to feminist ends .... ")
(emphasis supplied). Such an approach to feminism creates two troublesome assumptions: the idea of "feminist ends" is an intelligible, context-free notion; and that there is
a direct connection (in the sense that one leads to the other) between method and
insight.
259 Reflexivity-the turning of a critique back onto itself-is a central problem for all
forms of postmodern thought. The problem grown directly out of modernist conceptions of intelligibility. See HILARY LAWSON, REFLEXIVITY: THE POST-MODERN PREDICAMENT 43 (1985).
At the end of the turn of a century which has seen language become the
central concern of philosophy there is a risk of reading Nietzsche in the
light of modern debates. Nevertheless, Nietzsche was writing at a time
when the role of the thinking subject was still perhaps the dominant
theme of philosophy, he was no longer in a milieu that assumed language
to be transparent. (Once Kant had linked concepts with intuitions, experience could no longer be regarded as independent of the concepts by
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make gender relations intelligible. Like other practices of critical
reflection, feminist jurisprudence will succeed only to the extent
that it questions the vocabularies through which gender relations
are understood. 260 To force critical reflection on the juridical categories of gender relations, feminist jurisprudence must retell the
stories of gender in ways that enable us both to see the old in new
ways and to make sense of the new. 26 ' One myth of modernism is
that there is only one method for accomplishing this task.

which it is described. Kant thus laid the ground for an increasing role for
language.) However, in Nietzsche we see the clear expression of an outlook characteristic of our modem stance, namely the virtual elision of
thought into language. In a modem form of Occam's razor, Nietzsche
almost eliminated thought. Language, instead of representing thought,
provided concepts directly. 'Every word immediately becomes a concept,
inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and
wholly individualized experience to which it owes birth.' This is not to
imply that Nietzsche denied the existence of thought.., but to indicate
that the character of language was for him equatable with the character of
thought. For Nietzsche, therefore, to speak about language is to speak
about thought.
Il (quoting Nietzsche).
Narrational intelligibility addresses the problem of reflexivity not by solving the
problem, but by dissolving it by showing how the problem lies within modernist forms of
thought. See C.G. PRADO, THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM (1987).
The noumenal must be eradicated as an idea; no philosophical contrast
should be tolerated if it allows room for skeptical doubts within the linguistic, which exhausts what there is though somehow not in an ontological sense .... Philosophical theory can only attempt to get beyond the
linguistic through transcendental arguments. But if there is nothing beyond language-and we cannot even say nothing intelligible-then efforts at such theorizing must be pointless, and truth cannot be any sort of
faithful mirroring. The last thing truth can be is correspondence between
ideas or sentences and states of affairs as extralinguistic. To the tradition
all of this naturally looks like idealism; the Kantian distinction, or something like it, persists.
Id, at 75.
260 See STEPHEN T. LEONARD, CRITICAL THEORY IN POLITICAL PRACTICE 247 (1990).
Against the modernists, feminists show that neither the self, nor knowledge, nor theory, nor emancipation itself can be apprehended a priori. To
take seriously the fact that we are historical beings, that human life is a
continuous process of making and remaking social life, is to recognize
that the purported goal of critical theory, "a form of life free of domination in all of its forms," cannot be interpreted as a form of life that is free
of all conflicts of interests. To take seriously our historicity is to see that
it is neither possible nor desirable for critical theory to treat emancipation in universal terms.
See JEREMY BARRIS, GOD AND PLASTIC SURGERY: MARX, NIETZSCHE, FREUD AND
OBVIOUS 45 (1990) ("[Y]ou can only start off changing reality by changing your
knowledge, by remembering what you know so that you can change it.").
261
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Another modernist myth is that, with respect to "woman,

' 262

there is only one story to tell. 263 To dispel this myth, feminist juris-

prudence must shift its focus to different questions-questions that
are not "epistemological." 264 Moving beyond the essentialist paradism of looking at "woman" as something represented in law, we
should produce genealogies of "woman" in all her manifestations. 26 5 The lesson of postmodernism is that "woman" is not one
thing but many; we know "woman" by knowing her multiple (discursive) manifestations. To rethink the idea of "woman" we must
rethink the network(s) within which she is constructed. 26 6 How are
we to accomplish that?
With the abandonment of the modernist aspiration toward a
master discourse-Habermas's second-order "discourse of discourses" 26 7-comes the realization that progressive change in a discipline must be reconceived as coming not from without but from
within. That is, change must come from the redesign of our

tools. 26 8 Of course, "tool" is here used metaphorically, for the only

actual tools of the law are its concepts and linguistic practices.
262
The lesson of hermeneutics is that there is not just "one story to tell." The past
is always being understood anew. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD 306-7 (2d ed. 1989) (introducing the notion of "horizon fusion").
263
For a pioneering study of the importance of narrative in the understanding of
cooperative practices, see BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (2d ed. 1986) (advocating the abandonment of epistemology as a way of understanding the production of scientific knowledge).
264 Foucault entreats with a similar message.
[I]t is a question of forming a different grid of historical decipherment by
starting from a different theory of power; and, at the same time, of advancing little by little toward a different conception of power through a
closer examination of an entire historical material. We must at the same
time conceive of sex without the law, and power without the king.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SExuALrrY 90-91 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). See
also Charles Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology, in AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR TRANSFORMATION, supra note 2, at 464-88.
265 For an effective demonstration of the power of the genealogical method in matters of the body, see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE Lj. 1073 (1988).
266 See WEEDON, supra note 186, at 168.
The task for feminist criticism is to demonstrate how texts constitute gender for the reader in class- and race-specific ways and how these modes of
femininity and masculinity relate to the broader network of discourses on
gender both in the past and in the present.
Id.
A fine example of the application of this method in the context of social welfare is
found in NANCY FRASER, Women, Welfare, and the Politics of Need Interpretation, in UNRULY
PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 144-60

(1989).
267

For a devastating critique of Habermas's claims for the power of philosophy as a

second-order, legitimating enterprise, see James Tully, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: UnderstandingPracticesof Critical Reflection, 17 POL. THEORY 172 (1989).
268 As Kenneth Gergen puts it:
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Thus, to speak of "change," "transformation," or "reform" is to
raise what is, at bottom, a pragmatic question: How is "woman" to
269
be understood?
To answer this, we must first note that our understanding of
"woman" occurs within a horizon of fixed 2 70 meaning. For example, the meaning of a sentence within which "woman" appears is a
function of that sentence's position within an appropriate horizon.
That is, the meaning of the sentence is not some thing, or intention
or essence but is a function of the horizon within which the sentence
is at home. Thus, meaning is a function of a system of interconnected language-games that together constitute a "horizon of understanding." 2 7 1 Once the horizon of understanding is delimited,

the new and different can be integrated into

it.272

The new becomes

Any given set of tools both enables and constrains. It facilitates certain
lines of action while restricting others. Advancement in understanding
largely derives, then, from the development of new forms of discourse.
With the emergence of new language frames, the potential for effective
human action is augmented. To view social life as an exchange of reinforcements is both fascinating and rich in evocative potential-but ultimately delimited. Greater efficacy can be achieved if one has at one's
disposal lenses through which social life may be seen as sets of rituals,
theatrical presentations, economically determined patterns, power dynamics, dialectic transformations, and so on. In effect, the socio-behavioral sciences stand in an optimal position to contribute to the symbolic
resources of the culture.
Kenneth Gergen, Correspondence versus Autonomy in the Language of UnderstandingHuman
Action, in METATHEORY IN SOCIAl. SCIENCE 157 (Donald Fiske & Richard Shweder eds.,
1986).
269 See Murphy & McClendon, supra note 42, at 200 ("Postmodern epistemology
moves toward a new form of pragmatism in attempting to answer the question 'Why this
network (this rearrangement) rather then another?' ').
270
"Fixed" here means nothing more than "already in place": there is an established network of understanding, a practice.
271
A "one-step hermeneutics," if you will. See ROBERTJ. ACKERMANN, WrrrGENSTEIN'S Crry 19 (1988).
272
No one voices this sentiment better than the late Michael Oakeshott:
The problem of historical thinking is to detect what modification a new
discovery, a new experience produces in the world of history as a whole.
And the weakness of many historians is due to their inability to understand, first, that a new discovery, a new experience produces in the world
of history as whole. And the weakness of many historians is due to their
inability to understand, first that a new discovery cannot be appeased by
being fitted into an old world, but only by being allowed to transform the
whole of that world; and secondly, that the character of a new discovery is
not given and fixed, but is determined by its place in the world of history
as a whole. The general scheme, the initial world of ideas, they imagine
to have been given and to lie beyond the reach of criticism; and each new
discovery is, for them, equally fixed, solid and independent. New knowledge may be used to illustrate or to extend the old world, but never to
modify or transform it. But the fact is that this general scheme, with
which the historian begins, is a world of ideas given only in order that it
may be superseded. And to see the bearing of a new detail upon the
world of history as a whole is at once the task and difficulty of historical
thought. For each new discovery, whatever it may appear to be, is, in-
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manageable, since the horizon of meaning is such that it can be altered to accommodate the novel.
In thinking of understanding this way, we see immediately that
the point of interpretation is the reconstitution of understanding
within a particular horizon. 2 73 Owing to its status as a second-order,
reflective enterprise, legal interpretation is necessarily reconstructive: it allows us to regain a coherence that has, for one reason or
another, been lost. 2 74 The process of reconstruction is best described as "narrative" because it is through the narrative reconstruction of the point of the practice that the coherence necessary to
the intelligibility of law is maintained. Owing to its ongoing, developmental, and transformative character, law is described most perspicuously as a narrative discourse. If we are careful to delimit the
proper sphere of its narrational character, we will gain a better understanding of its ways and our role in it.

deed, not the discovery of a fresh detail, but of a new world. Every experience is, by implication, a complete world of experience. And each new
discovery must be seen in its place in that world, its effect must have been
felt upon that world, before its meaning can be said to have been apprehended, before it is 'discovered'. The process in historical thinking is
never a process of incorporation; it is always a process by which a given
world of ideas is transformed into a world that is more of a world.
MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, EXPERIENCE AND ITS MODES 98-99 (1933).
273 This approach is not without its difficulties. For example, the story of women's
emancipation from gender oppression is largely entangled with the story of racial oppression. See ELIzABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1989). For a recent discus-

sion of feminism in light of the relationships and semantic authority, see Richard Rorty,
Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REV. 231 (1991).
274

See WILLIAM HUBBARD, COMPLICITY AND CONVICTION: STEPS TOWARD AN ARCHI-

128-29 (1980).
The larger understanding that I speak of is aware not just of the particular case or law at issue but rather sees the whole context in which this
particular instance is located. A judge with this understanding would see
his task not as one of formulating a single, free-standing decision but
rather as forging a new link in a chain-linking his decision to those that
came before and making sure that later decisions will be able to link up
with his. For this larger understanding would know that a legal decision
cannot stand on its own, like a provable scientific statement. There is no
real reason why any decision must be the way it is, and any skeptical prying-or conversely, any attempts at verification with data-would only reveal that unprovability. It is the judge's reasoning that serves as a scrim
for us, which veils that unverifiability with reasoning that is just convincing enough so that our skepticism doesn't rise up in us. But the reasoning that makes a decision convincing consists almost wholly of a skillful

TECTURE OF CONVENTION

demonstration of how that decision adheres to principles contained in

earlier cases. That is why it is so important to keep the chain of cases
intact. Unless those cases are there to point to-and unless they are held
in esteem so that pointing to them means something-that reasoning will
convince no one.
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Narration is the analytical device through which we realize the
aspirations of a practice-based, nonpropositional account of legal
knowledge. The ability to solve conceptual problems in law means
being able to narrate the point of a legal practice in a way that preserves the point for the practice at the same moment it is transformed. This mode of analysis enables a participant in the practice,
at any point in its history, to see how the point of that practice got to
where it is at present and to imagine possibilities of how it might be
different. This process-rethinking the point of the practice-involves reconstructing the point of the practice in such a way that a
new point can be seen to emerge from earlier- stages of the
275
practice.
Through narrative reconstruction of the point of a practice, one
can chart the transformation of that practice as it responds to internal criticism from its participants, unforeseen or anomalous cases,
the integration of the practice with other practices, and a host of
other aspects. Narrative is successful as an analytical device in capturing these many and varied aspects of legal knowledge because it
enables us to see that understanding and interpretation stand in a
dynamic relationship. On a narrative account of legal knowledge,
understanding emerges not as a conservative notion but as the focus
of interpretive activity. Without understanding, interpretation
would simply bite on air. Without narration, understanding would
be wooden, lifeless, robotic in character. Narration is the dynamic
element in the understanding-interpretation dichotomy.
Narrative reconstruction steers a course between the Scylla of
2 76
essentialism and the Charybdis of free-wheeling Deconstruction.
275
See Noel Carroll, Art, Practiceand Narrative, 71 THE MONIST 140, 151 (1988) ("At
any point in the history of the practice (or practices) of art, the unity of the later stage of
development is rendered intelligible or explained within the practice by filling in the
narrative of its emergence from an earlier stage .... ").
276
Here I would agree, although for different reasons, with Christopher Norris and
Andrew Benjamin: Derrida is not postmodern. See CHRISTOPHER NORRIS & ANDREW
BENJAMIN, WHAT Is DECONSTRUCTION? 30 (1988) ("[P]ost-modernism effectively collapses a whole series of distinctions that still play a vital (though problematic) role in
Derrida's thinking."). See also CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, Limited Think: How Not to Read Derrida, in WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMOnERNISM? 134-64 (1990). Because Deconstruction
further atomizes the individual into discursive fragments, it represents the modernist
spirit at its most excessive. See Murphy & McClendon, supra note 42, at 211-12 (critiquing Mark Taylor's Deconstructionist A/Theology).
In the end, Derrida is just a skeptic-Hume in the cafe. Quentin Skinner makes the
point nicely:
Consider [Derrida's] much-discussed analysis in Spurs of the fragment,
found among Nietzsche's manuscripts, which reads "I have forgotten my
umbrella." Derrida concedes that there is no difficulty about understanding the meaning of the sentence. "Everyone knows what 'I have forgotten my umbrella' means. His only objection to the despised figure he
labels "the hermeneut" is that such persons fail to recognize that this still
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The idea of reforming our habits of understanding presupposes
that certain practices of understanding are intelligible, and may
therefore be criticized. 2 77 By postulating that all understanding is
interpretation, 278 Deconstruction, and other versions of "hermeneutic holism," give us no place to start. 27 9 Every place is as good
as any other,28 0 so no particular set of terms can be taken as the
appropriate place to begin.2 8 ' From the perspective ofjuridical narrative, the world (of law) is neither a representation of essentialist
forms nor a deconstructed disunity of discursive fragments. It is a
web of linguistic relationships composed of vocabularies wherein
and whereby individuals understand themselves and their social reality. 28 2 We can neither transcend these vocabularies nor remain
leaves us without any "infallible way" of recovering what Nietzsche may
have meant. "We will never knowfor sure what Nietzsche wanted to say or
do when he uttered these words."
If we insist, as Den-ida does, on... an equation between establishing that
something in the case and being able to demonstrate it "for sure," then
admittedly it follows that we can never hope to establish the intentions
with which a text may have been written. But equally it follows that we
can never hope to establish that life is not a dream. The moral of this,
however, is not that we have no reason to believe that life is not a dream.
The moral is rather that the skeptic is insisting on far too stringent an
account of what it means to have reasons for our beliefs. Haunted as
Den-ida seems to be by the ghost of Descartes, he has concentrated on
attacking a position which no theorist of intentionality need defend.
Quentin Skinnei, A Reply to My Critics, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND
His CRITICS 280-81 (James Tully ed., 1988).
277 Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following address this presupposition. See LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d

ed. 1958) (following a rule is a practice).
278 SeeJacques Den-ida, Diferance,inJACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON HUSSERL's THEORY OF SIGNS 129-60 (David B. Allison trans., 1973).
279 See Richard Shusterman, Beneath Interpretation: Against Hernieneutic Holism, 73 THE

MONIST 181,

196 (1990)

(describing variations on the "it's all interpretation"

orientation).
STEIN,

Thus, to Wittgenstein, "A doubt without an end is not even a doubt." WITrGENsupia note 248, at § 625.

281

See Richard Shusterman, Organic Unity: Analysis and Deconstruction, in REDRAWING

280

THE LINES: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, DECONSTRUCTION, AND LITERARY THEORY 110

(Reed

W. Dasenbrock ed., 1989).
[Den-ida] himself in maintaining that language excludes totalization characterizes its differential field as "a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble." Moreover, even forgoing the question of
totality, the very presumption that all the elements or objects in our
languaged world are essentially differentially interconnected and reciprocally constitutive of each other (however untotaled or untotalizable they
may be) clearly seems in itself to constitute a metaphysical perspective
predisposed to cosmic unity and coherence.
Id. (citation omitted).
282 See Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragamatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA.

L. REV. 937 (1990) (for a full account of this perspective).
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their obedient subjects. 283 We must reconstitute them and, in the
2 84
process, change our self-understanding.
This, then, is the project of a postmodern feminist jurisprudence: to problematize and reconstruct the many vocabularies
within which the law creates "woman. '2 85 The promise of such a
project is that "if we change language and practice together, and it
[is successful], we have achieved a special kind of explanatory vantage point for the understanding of our past practice."'2 8 6 What will
the "success" of such a feminist project look like?28 7 To answer this
question by prescribing a general criterion for success serves only to
duplicate the mistakes of previous modes of criticism. Only in specific contexts, with particular problems and vocabularies, can "success" be given content. To acknowledge this fact is not to avoid the
question, but to give it the answer it deserves.
And is not this issue of context, after all, the nagging element in
everything that is associated with "postmodernism"? The promise
of modernism is the forward march from darkness to enlightenment. 28 8 We know we have made progress because we perceive the
distance between where we are and the abyss from which we have
escaped. Offering nothing comparable to the promises of Enlight283 In other words, we must always begin the process of reconstitution from where
we are. See Taylor, supra note 264, at 475-76.
As those effectively engaged in the activities of getting to perceive and
know the world, we are capable of identifying certain conditions without
which our activity would fall apart into incoherence. The philosophical
achievement is to define the issues properly. Once this is done, as Kant
does so brilliantly in relation to Humean empiricism, we find there is only
one rational answer. Plainly we couldn't have experience of the world at
all if we had to start with a swirl of uninterpreted data. Indeed, these
wouldn't even be "data," because even this minimal description depends
on our distinguishing what is "given" by some objective source from
what we merely supply ourselves.

Id.
284

The mode of reinterpretation is narrative in so far as the methodological inspira-

tion is to render the present intelligible "by filling in the narrative of its emergence from
an earlier stage." Carroll, supra note 275, at 151. See also Dennis M. Patterson, Law,
Practice,Interpretationand Argument: Toward a Narrative Conception of Legal Discourse, 5 Soc.
EPISTEMOLOGY 61 (1991).

285
In much the same way, postmodernism in art problematizes the meaning of
"art." See Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-ModernArt and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1359, 1378 (1990) (" 'Art,' by its nature, will call into question any definition that we
ascribe to it. As soon as we put up a boundary, an artist will violate it, because that is
what artists do.").
286 Stephen P. Turner, Social Theory Without Wholes, 7 HUM. STUD. 259, 265 (1984).
287
I have already provided a specific example in the discussion of Zillah Eisenstein's
critique of Dworkin and MacKinnon on pornography. See supra notes 199-230 and accompanying text.
"Z However, as events in the twentieth century have demonstrated, modernity has.
its own forms of barbarism. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST
(1989) (dcmonstrating how the Holocaust is the outcome of modernity's unique triumvirate of hate, technology, and bureaucracy).
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enment rationality, postmodernism seems to merit our skepticism. 2 89 It is true that postmodernism has no program-it provides
no blueprint. So why "go postmodern"? 2 90 Again, this seems to be
the wrong question. If modernism's prospects no longer seem as
great as they once did, does it make sense to replace modernism
with an approach that only duplicates the problems of the past? A
negative answer has been suggested. 29 ' The lesson of postmodernism is that the answers to our questions are not already there waiting
to be found; instead they will have to be produced in the ways just
described.
CONCLUSION

We began by asking whether feminism requires the trappings of
modernity. This question is problematized by the uncertain status
of modernity itself. We have seen that "modernism" takes many
forms, and even in the context of the limited definition utilized here,
the claim that we are "in postmodernity" 29 2 is a dubious one. Like
the criticism of yesterday, the critical methods of contemporary social and political theory will simultaneously draw their strength from
available forms of discourse and seek to break the bounds of existing modes of criticism.29 3 When critics assert that theirs is an entirely new vision of the human condition, we must remind ourselves
2 94
of this humble lesson.
289 In the final analysis, this skepticism seems unwarranted. See Zygmunt Bauman, Is
There a Postmodern Sociology?, 5 THEORY, CULTURE & Soc'Y 217, 233 (1988) ("Mhe faith

in a historical agent waiting in the wings to take over and to complete the promise of
modernity using the levers of the political state-this faith has all but vanished.").
290
For an ambivalent answer, see Steve Fuller, Does It Pay to Go Postmodern If Your
Neighbors Do Not?, in AFTER THE FUTURE: POSTMODERN TIMES AND PLACES, supra note 68,

at 273-84. For the midlife crisis version, see Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) (Due to the influence of postmodernism, law teaching is
now just a form of training people to become glorified insurance adjusters.).
291
For a more positive answer, see WILLIAM CORLE'r, COMMUNITY WrrHoUT UN1TY:
A POLITICS OF DERRIDIAN EXTRAVAGANCE 201-02 (1989) ("Perhaps more concentration
on tactics at the level of the municipality (where common ground is usually taken literally instead of metaphorically) in addition to but alongside strategies on the high frontier of the individual/collective tension is the most radical politics of community
available.").
292

See, e.g., Charles Jencks, Death For Rebirth, in POST-MODERNISM ON TRIAL 6-9 (An-

dreas C. Papadakis ed., 1990) (trumpeting the triumph of postmodern architectural
style).
293
For an application of this process in social theory, see ROBERTO M. UNGER,POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987).
294 I have in mind contemporary intellectuals like Richard Rorty, whose claims for
contingency and irony fail to heed the lessons of Wittgenstein, of whose thought Rorty
isso enamored. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
There is no reason in general why contingency is to be favored over its opposite. There
are differences and similarities. This mistake is made at a more general level by contemporary social theorists who argue for one or another version of a "philosophy of differ-
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At this juncture, feminist jurisprudence is struggling with the
implications of the postmodern critique of reason. This state of affairs is both exciting and troubling. The excitement stems from the
knowledge that we are in the midst of rethinking ideas that are so
firmly embedded in our cultural psyche that we can hardly imagine
what it is to be without them. On the other hand, the failures and
shortcomings of these notions have become too numerous to overlook. 295 Feminist jurisprudence ignores them at its peril.

ence." See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE LJ. 2007 (1991)
(advancing the claim that scholarly "voice" is distinct by virtue of one's speaking from
one's own experience as a person of color). The irony here is that in their efforts to
argue for the priority of "difference," these theorists duplicate the fundamental mistake
of past philosophers-the reification of one aspect of a thing or person.
295 See generally GIANNI VATrIMO, THE END OF MODERNITY: NIHILISM AND HERMENEUTICS IN POSTMODERN CULTURE (Ion R. Snyder trans., 1988) (surveying the roots of modernism and philosophical efforts to theorize postmodernity).

